



UNSPOKEN PERMISSION

Platform Suppression of Populations Worldwide

A documented survey of social media suppression across nations and populations, 2014–2026. Accounts suspended. Voices removed. Reach reduced without notice. The same outcomes, repeated across every platform, in every language, for more than a decade.

DYSTOPIA PREVENTION BUREAU

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Coverage: 2014–May 2026 · Multi-language sources

t.me/InvolSilence

This document does not draw on posts found on the platforms themselves. Suppressed accounts cannot report their suppression on the platform that suppressed them. Every figure here is a floor. The ceiling is unreachable.

DOCUMENT CONTENTS

PART I — GLOBAL SURVEY

Preamble	<i>Personal note from the author; legal instruments invoked</i>
Operative Framework	<i>The structure of documented complicity</i>
Documented Scale: Global Figures	<i>Quantified statistics from official sources</i>
A Critical Distinction	<i>The independence of suppression from local government</i>
Nations With Documented Platform Suppression	<i>100+ nations across six regions</i>
The Pattern Before the Case	<i>Context for Part III</i>

PART II — THE UNITED STATES: DOCUMENTED STATE PROXIMITY TO PLATFORM SUPPRESSION

The Suppression Architecture Was Built With Public Funds	<i>DARPA SMISC and successor programmes, 2011–2022</i>
Platforms Maintained US Military Accounts While Removing Civilian Voices	<i>CENTCOM network; Twitter Files; Graphika/SIO</i>
A Federal Court Found Government Coercion of Platform Moderation	<i>Missouri v. Biden; Murthy v. Missouri; DOJ consent decree</i>
The Pentagon Contracted a Firm to Flag Dissenting Ukraine Coverage	<i>NewsGuard; \$750,000 DoD contract; Cyber Command</i>
The Pentagon Imposed Prior Restraint on Journalism	<i>September 2025 directive; federal court ruling March 2026</i>
What This Establishes	<i>Consolidated evidentiary table</i>

PART III — THE UKRAINIAN CASE

Reading the Database	<i>Badge legend and key</i>
Named Individuals — Master Table	<i>43 documented individuals</i>
In Their Own Words	<i>Verbatim testimony, attributed and sourced</i>
Expanded Case Profiles	<i>Full narrative for cases of particular significance</i>
Named Organisations and Media Outlets	<i>14 documented organisations</i>
Geographic Clusters — Quantified Data	<i>Lithuania, Ukraine, Bulgaria</i>
Hashtag and Content-Level Suppression	<i>Platform-wide blocking events</i>
The Markup — Instagram Structural Suppression	<i>Empirical investigation, 2024</i>
Pre-Invasion History — 2014 to February 2022	<i>The decade before the invasion</i>
X (Twitter) — Documented Shadowbanning, 2022–2023	<i>Ghost bans and code-level evidence</i>
Melitopol Telegram Administrators	<i>Arrested 2023, sentenced 2025 — longest known sentences</i>
USAID Collapse and Ukraine's Information Ecosystem	<i>February 2025</i>
Analytics Datasets	<i>Published data without platform API access</i>
Academic Sources	<i>Peer-reviewed research</i>
CEDEM Expert Testimony and NSDC Initiative	<i>2023–2024</i>

Primary Sources

AFTERWORD: ASSESSMENT AND LEGAL INDICTMENT

The Weight of What Was Buried

The Failure Is Not Accidental

The Global Dimension: Suppression As Cultural Genocide

The Legal Framework That Must Change

The Demand

APPENDIX — CONSOLIDATED SOURCES

Part II — The United States: Documented State Proximity

Part I — Global Survey

Part III — Ukrainian Case

Afterword

33 sourced references

Starobilsk, Bila Tserkva, the Oreshnik

How suppression cleared the field; the doubled silencing

Lemkin, global populations

UDHR, ICCPR, Genocide Convention, Rome Statute

The verdict

References [1]–[35]

Primary sources

Named individuals; organisations; datasets; academic; CEDEM

Sources and legal instruments

PREAMBLE

A personal note from the author.

I do not know if I will be alive tomorrow, or in five years. I know what I have seen, and I refuse to leave the world in silence. I refuse to leave it as it is — like meat left in a river of piranhas — without having said, as clearly as I am able, precisely what has presented itself through more than two decades of consistency, and why it must be stopped. This document is that statement.

Nearly every political argument you have ever had and nearly every fool you have seen hasn't been the consequence of propaganda; it has been a consequence of information suppression and censorship.

With the propagation of true information at the scale it would be without manipulation and interference at the behest of the three superpowers, most notably the United States, many of our social, cultural, and political conflicts would not exist today. Propaganda becomes the dominant voice not by outcompeting truth but by ensuring truth does not arrive — typically in documented coordination with the states in which these platforms are headquartered. There was never a radical conservative-liberal dichotomy across most of Europe. Many citizens worldwide confuse American law with their own. Cultural trends from a single state propagate in native languages across nations that oppose it politically. None of this is organic.

Widespread suppression of populations — even among their own countrymen — is the only logical conclusion. The propagation of a single cultural hegemon while suppressing all others is, without misusing the term, cultural genocide. The law does not yet say so. It must.

The solution is not stricter platform controls. The solution is less — suppressing propaganda is not a viable argument for the continuation and unspoken permission of the sustained overreach that has resulted, very clearly, in cultural genocide within the global information environment. The effectiveness of this approach is zero and will continue to be zero until full accountability is implemented. Without acknowledging the documented reality of coordinated suppression between platforms and the states to which they are beholden, nothing structurally changes.

Fighting propaganda is the romantic approach. Fighting the suppression that makes propaganda dominant — the kiss of death to transparency, and the prerequisite condition for both democracy and liberty — is the only path to a free future for all of humanity.

The fight against the suppression of information, populations, and the people themselves must be met with the same tenacity, courage, and violence of action with which ancient armies met enemy shields, pikes, and cavalry. There is no gentler metaphor that is honest.

LEGAL INSTRUMENTS INVOKED IN THIS DOCUMENT

UDHR Art. 19

Right to freedom of opinion, expression, and to receive and impart information through any media regardless of frontiers.

ICCPR Art. 19	State obligation to protect freedom of expression from interference, including by private actors operating within the state's regulatory jurisdiction.
Genocide Convention Art. II	Genocide defined as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.
Genocide Convention Art. III	Punishable acts include genocide, conspiracy, incitement, attempt, and — critically — complicity in genocide.
Rome Statute Art. 7	Crimes against humanity, including persecution against any identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, or religious grounds.
Lemkin — Cultural Genocide	Genocide encompasses the coordinated destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups — institutions, language, national feeling, and community infrastructure — with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.

These instruments are cited in the Afterword. They are listed here as the legal framework within which this document's call to action must be understood.

OPERATIVE FRAMEWORK

Inaction for over 12 years is permission. The permission is unspoken. No platform ever needed to say it aloud.

What is documented in this report is not a series of errors, oversights, or technical failures that platforms were unable to correct. It is the sustained, reviewed, and renewed outcome of choices made across more than a decade — across every major platform, across dozens of languages, across every continent where inconvenient voices operated.

Platforms had the capacity to build systems that could not produce these outcomes. They chose not to build them. They had the capacity to maintain moderation commensurate with their user bases in every language. They chose not to. They had the capacity to distinguish wartime documentation from peacetime policy violations, conflict journalism from hate speech, political dissent from terrorism. They chose not to.

The suppression of targeted voices and the simultaneous survival of state-aligned, propagandistic, and pro-authoritarian content are not two separate phenomena. They are two faces of the same decision. Platforms permitted both. That permission was never written down because it did not need to be. Outcomes that persist across twelve years, across every platform, across every language in which suppressed populations spoke, are the policy.

It is the conclusion of this document that this suppression is coordinated, intentional, and systemic. The evidence does not permit any other conclusion that accounts for the full breadth, duration, and consistency of what is documented here.

This document does not draw on posts found directly on the platforms themselves. Suppressed accounts cannot report their suppression on the platforms that suppressed them. What is documented here is only what escaped — into journalism, NGO reports, government correspondence, academic research, and third-party platforms. The true scale in every country is orders of magnitude larger than the documented record.

DOCUMENTED SCALE: GLOBAL FIGURES

The following figures are drawn from official reports, academic studies, and platform transparency disclosures. They represent what was measurable. What was not measurable — because the accounts that would have reported it were removed — is by definition absent from every dataset below.

57 of 72	countries covered by Freedom on Net 2025 had citizens arrested or imprisoned for online expression — a record high
43 countries	recorded people physically attacked or killed in reprisal for online activities (Freedom on Net 2024)
25 countries	saw governments restrict access to entire social media platforms (Freedom on Net 2024)
79%	of global internet users live in countries where posting political, social, or religious content could lead to arrest (2024)
15 consecutive years	of decline in global internet freedom — the longest documented continuous decline on record (Freedom on Net 2025)
27 countries	experienced deteriorating internet freedom conditions in 2025; only 17 improved
1,050+	cases of Meta platform suppression of pro-Palestinian content documented by Human Rights Watch in October–November 2023 alone — across more than 60 countries
131 cases	of pro-Ukrainian Facebook content suppressed in Lithuania alone in 10 months (Debunk.org/Vilnius University, 2022)
47.4%	of 57 Ukrainian media organisations studied had faced Facebook or Instagram restrictions since February 2022 (CEDEM, 2023)
60%	of ban appeals by Ukrainian users in year one of the full-scale invasion were successful — meaning more than half of all bans were incorrectly applied (CEDEM)
4 of 131	Facebook restrictions on Lithuanian pro-Ukrainian users were reversed on appeal — 127 of 131 incorrect bans were upheld

A CRITICAL DISTINCTION

The vast majority of suppression documented in this report was not requested by the local government of the country in which it occurred.

This is not a report about governments censoring their own populations through platform compliance — though that does occur and is noted where it does. The suppression documented here is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, entirely independent of any request from the local state. It happened to populations regardless of what their own governments wanted. It happened to voices that their own governments had no interest in silencing. It happened because the platforms decided — through design, through policy, through sustained inaction — that those voices would be suppressed.

The Lithuanian government did not ask Facebook to suppress Lithuanian voices supporting Ukraine. The Bulgarian government did not ask Meta to restrict Bulgarian pro-Ukrainian activists. The governments of dozens of nations across Africa, Latin America, and Asia did not ask platforms to suppress journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens documenting what was happening in their own countries. The suppression occurred independently. The platforms chose it.

The notable exceptions — where suppression does align with, or is directed by, the local state — are specific and must be named precisely:

China is the clearest case of domestic state-directed platform suppression, where Western platforms either comply with state demands or are excluded from the market entirely. The architecture of suppression is the state's, and platforms have chosen access over principle at every juncture.

Most specifically: the United States. The platforms are registered, headquartered, and primarily beholden to the United States. Their leadership answers to US investors, US regulators, and US political pressure. The content policies, moderation architectures, and suppression outcomes documented throughout this report were designed, maintained, and renewed inside American corporate and regulatory culture. When suppression patterns across the entire world converge on outcomes that are consistent with American geopolitical interests and American cultural hegemony, the most parsimonious explanation is not coincidence.

Every other country in this report is, in the main, a country whose population was suppressed — not at their government's request, but by a system designed elsewhere, maintained elsewhere, and accountable primarily to interests elsewhere.

PART I

GLOBAL SURVEY

Documented suppression of civil voices across more than 100 nations, 2014–2026. The suppression documented here is not a series of errors. It is the consistent, reviewed, and renewed outcome of choices.

NATIONS WITH DOCUMENTED PLATFORM SUPPRESSION

The following list documents nations where platform suppression of individual voices — account suspensions, shadowbans, demonetisations, post deletions, reach reduction, hashtag blocks, and feature restrictions — has been officially reported, academically studied, or documented in investigative journalism. Government bans on platforms are not included. Physical suppression is not included. This list concerns only what platforms did, or chose to permit, to voices on those platforms. In the vast majority of cases, the suppression was entirely independent of any request from the local government of the country in which it occurred.

EUROPE

Ukraine

Most extensively documented case globally. Platform suppression of Ukrainian-language content, war documentation, volunteer fundraising, OSINT, and journalism dating to 2014, continuing as of 2026. Unspoken permission operated across Facebook, Instagram, Twitter/X, TikTok, YouTube, Patreon, and Apple App Store simultaneously. 47.4% of Ukrainian media organisations studied had been restricted by Meta since February 2022. Full documentation in the Ukrainian case section of this report.

Lithuania

131 documented cases of pro-Ukrainian Facebook content suppressed in 10 months (Debunk.org/Vilnius University, 2022). Lithuanian-language terms for Russian forces flagged as hate speech despite confirmation by the Lithuanian Language Institute that they are standard usage. Facebook reversed only 4 of 131 restrictions on appeal. €53.8 million in Ukraine aid raised via Facebook was disrupted by content restrictions.

Bulgaria

Documented wave of pro-Ukrainian writers, poets, journalists, and activists restricted simultaneously on Facebook. Georgi Georgiev (BOEC): banned 50 times over 5 years; total ban time exceeded 3 years. Christo Komarnitski (cartoonist, 52,000+ followers): account restricted for pro-Ukrainian content. In January 2023, dozens protested outside TELUS International Bulgaria — Meta's contracted content moderator — under the slogan "The Blocked are Blocking."

Poland

Polish-language pro-Ukrainian content flagged in Debunk.org research findings. Polish users documenting Russian atrocities reported restriction patterns identical to those experienced in Lithuania.

Germany

German-language OSINT and Ukraine-support accounts documented as restricted. Freedom on Net 2025: score declined 3 points. Self-censorship increased among journalists due to legal reprisals against those criticising foreign governments online. Coordinated X networks targeting German public opinion against Ukraine support were documented operating while pro-Ukrainian German voices were being restricted.

Czech Republic

Johana Bazlerova (@jsemvobraze, 225,000 Instagram followers): subject of peer-reviewed study (Heřmanová et al., Continuum, 2025) documenting simultaneous amplification and suppression of pro-Ukrainian content — viral moments followed by unexplained demonetisation and reach reduction without notification.

Turkey / Türkiye

At least 5 journalists in exile had social media accounts censored inside Turkey in 2025 alone (RSF). 178 accounts censored in a single government order. Platforms comply with government orders while also suppressing opposition voices independently. Documented across Twitter, Facebook, Google, TikTok, and LinkedIn via EngelliWeb reports.

Belarus

Journalists and activists covering the 2020 Lukashenko crackdown had accounts suspended across platforms. Political blogger Andrei Parotnikau sentenced to 10 years in 2024, partly for social media content. Content documenting post-election violence suppressed on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.

Serbia

Pro-government accounts amplified before 2023 elections; opposition and civil society voices documented as suppressed. Freedom House documented coordinated progovernment content manipulation on platforms that platforms did not act against.

Hungary

Civil society organisations and independent journalists report content restrictions and reduced Facebook reach tied to coverage of the Orbán government.

Georgia

Most significant decline among previously "Free" countries in Freedom on Net 2025 (−4 points). Content about mass protests against the government restricted across platforms.

Azerbaijan

Meydan TV Facebook page had all content from 2018 onward deleted in June 2020. Two months of Instagram content simultaneously deleted. Hundreds of Azerbaijani dissidents and journalists identified as Pegasus targets in 2021. Social media presence suppressed in coordination with physical arrest of journalists 2023–2025.

Moldova

Journalists and activists face account restrictions. Russian-linked influence operations active on Moldovan platforms while Moldovan counter-voices are suppressed — an asymmetry platforms did not address.

Armenia

Content restrictions on Armenian voices covering the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Social media documented as central to the 2018 Velvet Revolution; subsequent attempts to use platforms for political mobilisation faced suppression.

Latvia

Pro-Ukrainian and anti-Kremlin voices documented as restricted on Facebook. Baltic-language content flagged by the same automated systems that targeted Lithuanian and Estonian content.

Estonia

OSINT and pro-Ukrainian accounts documented as restricted, including accounts contributing to the same communities as those suppressed in Lithuania.

Romania

Independent journalists and anti-corruption activists report content restrictions and shadowbanning on Facebook and Instagram. Romanian-language content about Russian aggression flagged by automated systems.

Croatia

Independent journalists and civil society voices report Facebook reach reduction and content restrictions on political content.

Slovakia

Journalists and activists report account restrictions, particularly around content critical of pro-Russian political figures and narratives.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Journalists documenting war crimes and political corruption report content restrictions across Meta platforms.

North Macedonia

Journalists and civil society organisations report account restrictions on political content, particularly around elections.

Montenegro

Independent journalists and anti-corruption voices report Facebook and Instagram content restrictions.

Albania

Journalists covering political corruption report reduced reach and content restrictions on Meta platforms.

Kosovo

CPJ documented cases of social media account blocks; journalists report content restrictions.

Cyprus

Journalists and activists report content restrictions on political and conflict-related content.

Malta

Journalists investigating government corruption report content restrictions and reduced reach on Meta platforms.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Palestine / Gaza

HRW documented over 1,050 cases of content removal or suppression on Meta platforms in October–November 2023 alone, across more than 60 countries. Six suppression patterns identified: removals, account suspension or deletion, inability to engage with content, inability to follow or tag accounts, restriction of features such as Instagram Live, and shadowbanning. Meta was informed of the problem by HRW in 2021 — two years before the October 2023 escalation — and did not act.

Palestine / West Bank

Suppression of Palestinian voices from the West Bank documented separately from Gaza. Human rights organisations, journalists, and activists covering Israeli settlement expansion and military operations in the West Bank report content restrictions, account suspensions, and shadowbanning across Meta platforms specifically.

Israel (Palestinian solidarity voices)

Included in the same HRW 60-country dataset. Content from users inside Israel expressing solidarity with Palestinian civilians was suppressed alongside content originating in Gaza. Israeli human rights organisations report content restrictions on documentation of military operations.

Iran

Anti-government voices during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests documented as suppressed on Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok. Platforms simultaneously permitted Iranian state narratives to circulate unchallenged on the same platforms.

Egypt

Government arrested activists for critical social media comments continuously from 2015 onward. Platform suppression of independent journalism and human rights documentation ongoing. Freedom on Net 2025: among countries with most extreme declines over 15 years.

Saudi Arabia

Critics of the government have accounts suspended or restricted across platforms. In May 2025, a British citizen was sentenced to 10 years in prison over a deleted 2018 social media post; reduced to 8 years on appeal. Cross-platform suppression of government-critical content recorded by multiple NGOs continuously.

Jordan

The 2023 Cybercrime Law used to suppress mass protest movements online. Content restrictions documented by Freedom House 2024. Platform compliance with government requests combined with independent platform suppression of political content.

Iraq

Journalists and activists face routine content suppression. Freedom House documents continuous cases of accounts restricted for political and corruption-related content.

Syria

Documentation of the Syrian civil war and atrocities suppressed across platforms. Human rights organisations report content removed for graphic content policies applied to war documentation while state-aligned content circulates.

Yemen

Civilian documentation of airstrikes and humanitarian conditions disproportionately removed across platforms while conflict actors' content circulates.

Lebanon

Independent journalists documenting economic collapse and political corruption report account restrictions and reduced reach on Meta platforms.

Tunisia

Post-2021 democratic backslide accompanied by social media restrictions on opposition voices and journalists covering the government's authoritarian consolidation.

Morocco

Journalists and activists report account restrictions tied to coverage of Western Sahara and political dissent. Content about the Rif protest movement suppressed.

Algeria

Journalists and activists face account restrictions. Online expression criminalised under national security provisions applied on platforms with platform compliance.

Libya

Journalists operating in a conflict zone report content suppressed on multiple platforms with no recourse and no platform support infrastructure.

Bahrain

Opposition voices and human rights defenders documented as suppressed across platforms since 2011; pattern continues through 2025.

Kuwait

Journalists and activists documenting political issues report content restrictions on social media platforms.

Oman

Independent voices covering political and labour issues report content restrictions on Meta platforms.

Mauritania

Journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions on Facebook, the dominant social media platform in the country.

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Kazakhstan

Blogger Askhat Niyazov arrested in 2024 for reposting a Telegram comment the authorities deemed objectionable. Content about the January 2022 "Bloody January" protests suppressed. Platform regulatory compliance goes beyond government requests — platforms suppress content independently of formal requests in ways that consistently target critics.

Kyrgyzstan

Government ordered blocking of independent outlet Kloop's website after it reported on an opposition figure's torture allegations; the umbrella organisation was later ordered to liquidate (Freedom House 2024). Social media restrictions documented around elections. Platform content suppression of independent journalism ongoing.

Tajikistan

Journalists and activists face account suppression across platforms. CPJ documented cases continuously. Content about political opposition and government corruption restricted.

Turkmenistan

Among the world's most restricted information environments. Independent journalists operating in exile face account restrictions from platforms. Content about Turkmenistan suppressed across YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram with no platform support for affected creators.

Uzbekistan

Social media increasingly restricted; content critical of the government removed under government pressure combined with independent platform suppression.

Georgia

Freedom on Net 2025: most significant decline among previously Free countries (−4 points). Content about mass protests against the pro-Russian government restricted across platforms, particularly on X and Facebook.

China

The most extensive documented case of sustained platform complicity globally. Content critical of the government, documentation of Tiananmen, Uyghur persecution, Hong Kong protests: all suppressed. Journalist Gao Yu disconnected from internet in August 2024 in retaliation for online commentary. Mandatory identity verification for all social media posting imposed July 2025. No Western platform has ever treated access to the Chinese market as contingent on ending any aspect of this suppression. Freedom on Net 2025: worst in the world.

Myanmar

Since the 2021 military coup, thousands imprisoned for online speech. Content suppressed across all platforms. Facebook acknowledged its systems failed Myanmar — the same acknowledgment it made for the Rohingya genocide, after the fact. The pattern of acknowledgment followed by no structural change is consistent across every country in this list. Freedom on Net 2025: tied with China as world's worst.

India

Government using the Sahyog portal (2024–2025) to bulk-flag and bulk-remove content. India now classified among countries where Facebook and Instagram can automatically restrict content on government direction (The Wire, April 2026). 1,11,185 pieces of content blocked by March 2025. Opposition politicians had accounts blocked during protests. Journalists documented as persistent targets of coordinated account attacks.

Bangladesh

Opposition voices and journalists suppressed during political crackdowns. Content about the 2024 student protests that toppled the Hasina government suppressed on multiple platforms before and during the protests. Freedom on Net 2025: strongest improvement (+5 points) after government change — demonstrating that platform suppression patterns shift with political change.

Pakistan

Content about enforced disappearances and Baloch activists routinely removed. Social media regulations passed secretly in 2020. Among countries with most extreme declines in internet freedom over 15 years.

Vietnam

Government demands for content removal consistently complied with by platforms. Journalists and activists face account suspensions. Platforms apply content restrictions against Vietnamese independent media beyond formal government requests.

Philippines

Journalists and activists critical of both the Duterte and Marcos administrations documented as having content restricted. "Red-tagging" of critics amplified on platforms while their responses were suppressed — a documented and consistent asymmetry.

Thailand

Content critical of the monarchy suppressed on platforms at government request and independently. Activists and journalists face account restrictions for content classified under lèse-majesté provisions.

Indonesia

Content critical of government policies on Papua and West Papua suppressed. Religious minority voices documented as restricted across Meta platforms.

Malaysia

Independent journalists and activists report content restrictions on political content. Platforms comply with government content removal requests while also independently suppressing political speech.

Singapore

Journalists and activists report content restrictions, particularly around content the government deems to violate its Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act — with platforms complying proactively beyond formal requests.

Hong Kong

Post-2019 suppression of pro-democracy voices across all major platforms. Content documenting protests and the National Security Law's application suppressed. Platform compliance with Hong Kong/Beijing requests combined with independent suppression of documentation.

Taiwan

Journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions on political content, particularly around cross-strait relations and content Beijing objects to.

Sri Lanka

Content documenting the 2022 economic crisis and protests suppressed across platforms during the government's information control attempts.

Afghanistan

Under Taliban rule, content by women journalists, human rights defenders, and voices opposing the Taliban suppressed across platforms with no platform support infrastructure for affected users.

Cambodia

Independent journalists and opposition voices face account restrictions alongside government pressure. Platform compliance with government requests combined with independent content suppression.

Nepal

Freedom House 2025 described social media crackdown as reflecting a global censorship trend. Internet freedom declined. Journalists report content restrictions on political content.

Laos

Independent voices and journalists face content restrictions on political content. Platform suppression operates in one of the world's most closed information environments.

Papua New Guinea

Journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions, particularly around coverage of resource extraction and indigenous rights.

Fiji

Independent journalists and political activists report content restrictions around elections and political content on Meta platforms.

Maldives

Journalists documenting political corruption and human rights issues report content restrictions and account suspensions.

Timor-Leste

Journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions on Facebook, the dominant social media platform in the country.

AFRICA

Ethiopia

Content documenting the Tigray conflict (2020–2022) suppressed across platforms. Facebook acknowledged systems failure — after the fact, after the atrocities. Amharic-language content flagged and removed while incitement to violence against Tigrayans circulated. The pattern of acknowledgment followed by no structural change repeated here as everywhere else.

Nigeria

During the #EndSARS police brutality protests, Nigerian users documenting state violence faced suppression on multiple platforms simultaneously. Platform inaction allowed coordinated attacks on activist accounts while restricting their content.

Tanzania

Prominent activist Maria Sarungi-Tsehai's Instagram account restricted within Tanzania following a government directive, December 2025. Diaspora activist Mange Kimambi's Meta accounts suspended simultaneously. Popular news platform JamiiForums suppressed for 90 days before the 2025 election. Meta's Oversight Board stayed silent throughout. Rights groups describe a "censorship killswitch" trend enabled by platform compliance.

Uganda

Activist Stella Nyanzi sentenced to 18 months for a Facebook post in 2019; acquitted on appeal after 15 months served; relocated to Germany 2022. Novelist Kakwenza Rukirabashaija charged for Twitter posts in 2022. Platforms took no action on the coordinated attacks on these accounts before suppression occurred.

Kenya

Freedom on Net 2025's most severe single-year decline (–6 points). Journalists and activists documenting the 2024 protests report content restrictions and account suspensions across platforms.

Zimbabwe

Activists using #ThisFlag, #ZimbabweShutdown, and #ShutDownZim had accounts and hashtags suppressed. Independent online news outlets regularly targeted with no platform protection.

Sudan

Content documenting the ongoing civil war and atrocities faces platform suppression of graphic documentation. Conflict documentation removed under content policies that are not applied symmetrically across conflicts.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Described by CEDEM expert Joan Barata as a "forgotten war" where platforms engage minimally with local actors. Content suppressed with no advocacy infrastructure comparable to what exists for Ukraine or Palestine. The disparity in platform attention across conflicts is itself a form of permitted suppression.

Senegal

Opposition voices and protest documentation suppressed during 2023–2024 political crises. Journalists report content restrictions on Facebook and Instagram.

Cameroon

Anglophone Cameroonian voices documenting the Ambazonia conflict suppressed across platforms. French-language government narrative faces fewer restrictions on the same platforms — a documented linguistic asymmetry.

South Africa

Civil society and activist voices report content restrictions around coverage of government corruption. Journalists report reduced reach on Meta platforms for political content.

Rwanda

Social media increasingly regulated; critical voices face restrictions reflecting platform compliance with government requests.

Mozambique

Journalists routinely face content suppression. Two journalist disappearances under investigation as of August 2025. Content about political opposition and election irregularities restricted.

Zambia

Journalists and activists report content restrictions on political content. Filming of political events suppressed with platform inaction toward coordinated reporting attacks.

Mali

Independent journalists and civil society voices report content suppressed on Facebook under military junta pressure, with platform compliance extending beyond formal requests.

Burkina Faso

Independent voices face content restrictions on Meta platforms in coordination with the military junta's broader information control.

Guinea

Independent journalists report content restrictions on political content and suppression of documentation of political violence.

Chad

Journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions, particularly around elections and political opposition content.

Niger

Independent voices report content restrictions on Meta platforms following the 2023 coup.

Togo

Opposition voices and independent journalists report content restrictions on Facebook and Twitter/X.

Gabon

Independent voices report content restrictions particularly around the 2023 coup and its aftermath.

Angola

Independent journalists and activists report content restrictions on political content and documentation of government corruption.

Central African Republic

Independent voices documenting the ongoing conflict and Russian Wagner Group presence report content suppression across platforms.

Somalia

Journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions on political and conflict-related content with no platform support infrastructure.

Eritrea

One of the world's most restricted information environments. The few independent voices that exist online report content suppression with no recourse.

South Sudan

Journalists documenting the ongoing conflict and human rights abuses report content restrictions across Meta platforms.

Malawi

Independent journalists report content restrictions on Facebook, the dominant social media platform, particularly around political content.

Lesotho

Journalists and activists report content restrictions on political content on Meta platforms.

Eswatini / Swaziland

Pro-democracy voices and journalists report content restrictions on platforms under the absolute monarchy's political pressure.

Madagascar

Independent journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions on political content on Facebook.

Comoros

Journalists and activists report content restrictions on political content on Meta platforms.

Botswana

Independent journalists report content restrictions around election-related content and political opposition coverage.

THE AMERICAS

Venezuela

Government-ordered suppression of social media during and after the disputed July 2024 presidential election. Digital journalists detained; people who criticised the government online forcibly disappeared. Freedom on Net 2025: second-largest single-year decline (−4 points). Among countries with most extreme declines over 15 years.

Cuba

Journalists and dissidents documenting the 2021 protests had content suppressed and accounts restricted across platforms. Platform suppression operated independently of and in addition to the Cuban government's own information controls.

Nicaragua

Journalists operating in exile document having content restricted and accounts suspended while the Ortega government uses platforms freely. The asymmetry — one voice up, another down — is the consistent documented pattern.

Mexico

Journalists covering cartels and corruption document account restrictions across platforms. Content documenting drug war violence suppressed. More than 900 journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean forced into exile since 2018 (UNESCO, 2026).

Colombia

Human rights defenders and journalists covering paramilitary violence and state violence document account restrictions. Content documenting massacres of social leaders suppressed on Meta platforms.

Brazil

During the Bolsonaro period: documented suppression of some opposition content alongside amplification of pro-government disinformation. Indigenous rights activists and environmental defenders document content restrictions on deforestation and violence documentation. Platform suppression of indigenous voices operating independently of formal government requests.

El Salvador

Content critical of the Bukele government restricted. Journalists face content restrictions on Meta platforms with platform compliance extending beyond formal legal requests.

Guatemala

Independent journalists covering corruption face account restrictions and government pressure on platforms. Platform suppression of anti-corruption coverage documented.

Honduras

Journalists and activists face content restrictions on political content. Coordinated attacks on activist accounts met with platform inaction.

Haiti

Documentation of gang violence and humanitarian crisis suppressed. With virtually no functioning appeals infrastructure, Haitian voices have no recourse — a fact platforms have not addressed.

Bolivia

Journalists and opposition voices report social media account restrictions tied to political content. Platform suppression of independent journalism documented.

Peru

Independent journalists covering political corruption and protests report content suppression. Account restrictions documented around the 2022–2023 political crisis.

Ecuador

Journalists covering organised crime and political corruption report content restrictions and account suspensions on Meta platforms.

Paraguay

Independent journalists report content restrictions on political content on Facebook, the dominant social media platform.

Dominican Republic

Journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions around political content and election coverage.

Jamaica

Independent journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions on political content on Meta platforms.

Trinidad and Tobago

Journalists report content restrictions on political content. Platform suppression of independent journalism documented.

Panama

Journalists covering the Canal, corruption, and political content report content restrictions on Meta platforms.

Costa Rica

Independent voices report content restrictions on political content, particularly around the 2022 elections.

Guyana

Journalists and civil society voices report content restrictions on political content, particularly around the country's oil boom and its political consequences.

PART II

THE UNITED STATES

Documented State Proximity to Platform Suppression

The following section presents the documented evidentiary record of United States government involvement in the architecture, deployment, and legal adjudication of platform suppression. All claims are sourced. References [1]-[35] resolve in the Appendix.

PART II — THE UNITED STATES: DOCUMENTED STATE PROXIMITY TO PLATFORM SUPPRESSION

The document has established throughout that platform suppression outcomes are consistent with US geopolitical interests. The following documented record moves that observation from inference to evidence. It is not exhaustive. It is sufficient.

THE SUPPRESSION ARCHITECTURE WAS BUILT WITH PUBLIC FUNDS

In 2011, DARPA published a formal solicitation for the Social Media in Strategic Communication programme — SMISC — funded at \$42 million, later expanded to approximately \$50 million over four years.^[1] ^[2] ^[3] The programme's stated objectives included automated detection and classification of narratives, tracking of information flows across social networks, identification of sentiment and opinion, modelling of emergent communities, and the countering of what it defined as deception campaigns.^[4] The methodology developed under SMISC — linguistic pattern detection, narrative tracking, influence mapping, coordinated content suppression — is the technical foundation of the content moderation architecture the major platforms subsequently deployed at scale.

The programme operated explicitly within the framework of Military Information Support Operations, the successor designation to psychological operations.^[5] Over 200 academic papers were published from its research. The methodology did not remain in the military. It migrated into the private sector, into the platforms, and into the suppression systems documented throughout this report. DARPA subsequently built successor programmes on the same foundations: INCAS (Influence Campaign Awareness and Sensemaking, 2020) to detect and track geopolitical influence campaigns in real time, and Civil Sanctuary (2022) for multilingual AI content moderation. The infrastructure was not a project. It was a programme of continuous institutional development.

Programme	Agency	Year	Funding	Stated Purpose
SMISC — Social Media in Strategic Communication	DARPA	2011–2015	~\$50M	Narrative tracking, sentiment detection, influence mapping, counter-deception
INCAS — Influence Campaign Awareness and Sensemaking	DARPA	2020	Undisclosed	Detect, characterise, and track geopolitical influence campaigns at scale
Civil Sanctuary	DARPA	2022	Undisclosed	Multilingual AI content moderation exceeding current platform capability
Misinformation Fingerprints	DoD / New sGuard	2021–2023	\$750,000	Catalogue of narratives flagged as misinformation; Ukraine/Russia coverage

THE PLATFORMS MAINTAINED US MILITARY ACCOUNTS WHILE REMOVING CIVILIAN VOICES

Between March 2012 and August 2022, Twitter maintained and in several cases actively assisted a network of accounts linked to US Central Command, running coordinated campaigns targeting audiences in the Middle East and Central Asia.^[6] ^[7] The Stanford Internet Observatory and Graphika identified at least 173 Twitter accounts plus 39 Facebook profiles, 16 pages, 2 groups, and 26 Instagram accounts removed for coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Meta confirmed the country of origin as the United States.^[8]

The Twitter Files investigation (Part 8, Lee Fang, December 2022) established that senior Twitter executives were aware of the CENTCOM network from at least 2017 and did not act.^[9] ^[28] Twitter actively assisted CENTCOM in whitelisting accounts. A July 2020 internal email shows Twitter's lead attorney Jim Baker musing that the Pentagon had used "poor tradecraft" in setting up its network and seeking strategies to avoid exposing accounts "linked to each other or to DoD or the USG." A second email from senior Twitter attorney Stacia Cardille noted that the Pentagon wanted to retroactively classify its social media activities "to obfuscate their activity in this space" and that this "may represent an overclassification to avoid embarrassment." Twitter's comms team remained in close contact with journalists covering the story to minimise Twitter's exposure; internal records show executives congratulating each other when Washington Post coverage focused on the Pentagon rather than on Twitter's role.

Some accounts were not suspended until May 2022 — the same period in which Ukrainian fundraisers, journalists, and OSINT accounts documented in Part III were suspended for posting accurate wartime content. After the 2022 Graphika/Stanford exposure, the network did not stop: sites rebranded, some updating their disclosure language to acknowledge they were publicly funded by the US government.^[29]

The Pentagon's own internal review confirmed the accounts existed and that there were no specific rules requiring truthful information for psychological operations.^[10]

The platforms that maintained US military covert accounts for up to ten years — suspending them only after journalists exposed them — were simultaneously suspending Ukrainian journalists, OSINT researchers, and fundraisers for posting accurate content about an active war in the same period.

Platform	Accounts Identified	Period Active	Origin Confirmed	Action Taken
Twitter / X	173+ accounts	Mar 2012 – Aug 2022	US and UK (Twitter's own attribution)	Some suspended May 2022; remainder Aug 2022 — years after internal detection
Facebook / Instagram	39 profiles, 16 pages, 2 groups, 26 Instagram accounts	2017 – Jul 2022	United States (Meta's own attribution)	Removed August 2022
Multiple platforms	150+ total personas; AI-generated profile photos; front news sites	2012–2022	Pentagon audit confirmed; CENTCOM named	Network continued post-exposure under rebranded sites

THE GOVERNMENT-PLATFORM MODERATION SYSTEM WAS FORMAL, MULTI-AGENCY, AND DOCUMENTED

The CENTCOM network is one documented component of a broader documented system. The Twitter Files (Parts 1, 6, 9, 11, 12 — Taibbi, Fang, Weiss, December 2022 – January 2023) established that Twitter, Facebook, Google, and other major platforms developed a formal infrastructure for receiving moderation requests from across the federal government.^[30] The FBI was not the exception — it was, in Taibbi's characterisation, "the doorman to a vast programme of social media surveillance and censorship, encompassing agencies across the federal government — from the State Department to the Pentagon to the CIA."^[30]

The documented participants include: the White House; the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force (80 agents, created after 2016, attending regular joint meetings with platforms); the Department of Homeland Security; the Department of Health and Human Services; the Department of Defense; the State Department's Global Engagement Center; the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence; and the CIA — identified in documents by its standard inter-agency euphemism "Other Government Agency" or OGA.^[30] Prior to the 2020 election, Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, Discord, Wikipedia, Microsoft, LinkedIn, and Verizon Media met monthly with the FBI, CISA, and other government representatives.^[31]

CISA — the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, a component of DHS — acknowledged it lacked legal authority to conduct content suppression directly. Its documented response was to fund and direct the Election Integrity Partnership (EIP), a consortium led by the Stanford Internet Observatory (with Graphika, the Atlantic Council's DFRLab, and the University of Washington's Center for an Informed Public) to perform functions the government constitutionally could not perform itself.^[31] The EIP flagged nearly 4,800 items to platforms; platforms took action — removing, labelling, or soft-blocking — on 35% of them.^[31] DHS attempted to formalise this infrastructure publicly in April 2022 with the Disinformation Governance Board; it was dissolved in August 2022 under public pressure. The infrastructure it was meant to formalise continued operating without the public-facing component.

A FEDERAL COURT FOUND GOVERNMENT COERCION OF PLATFORM MODERATION

In *Missouri v. Biden*, the US District Court for the Western District of Louisiana issued a 155-page ruling on July 4, 2023 — based on over 1,400 documented facts — finding that officials at the White House, the Surgeon General's Office, the CDC, the FBI, and CISA had likely coerced or significantly encouraged social media platforms such that their content moderation decisions should be deemed decisions of the government.^[11] ^[12] The court documented at least 22 instances of what it characterised as unrelenting pressure by White House officials on technology companies, finding specifically that the White House "made it very clear to social-media companies what they wanted suppressed and what they wanted amplified."^[13] The court further found that DHS had expanded the word "infrastructure" in its terminology to include "cognitive infrastructure" so as to create authority to monitor and suppress protected free speech posted on social media — effectively redefining political speech as a national security threat.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's findings, concluding that the government had "engaged in a years-long pressure campaign designed to ensure that the censorship aligned with the government's preferred viewpoints" and that "the platforms, in capitulation to state-sponsored pressure, changed their moderation policies."^[33] The case reached the Supreme Court as *Murthy v. Missouri*. The Court dismissed on standing in June 2024, declining to rule on the merits.^[14] The district court's factual findings and the Fifth Circuit's affirmation of them were not disturbed.

In March 2026, the Department of Justice entered a consent decree binding the Surgeon General, CDC and CISA: they are prohibited for ten years from threatening social media companies with legal, regulatory, or economic sanctions to compel suppression of protected speech.^[15] ^[16] The decree is a negotiated settlement containing no admission of past wrongdoing — Lawfare has specifically noted it does not constitute court-endorsed proof of a censorship regime.^[34] It is, nonetheless, a binding legal instrument enforced by a federal court — one that would not have been necessary if the conduct it prohibits had not been real.

A district court's 155-page factual findings, a Fifth Circuit affirmation, and a DOJ consent decree are not allegations. They are the institutional record.

THE PENTAGON CONTRACTED A PRIVATE FIRM TO FLAG DISSENTING UKRAINE COVERAGE

In September 2021, the US Department of Defense awarded NewsGuard Technologies a \$749,387 contract for its Misinformation Fingerprints project — a catalogue of narratives flagged as misinformation, with particular focus on Ukraine and Russia coverage.^[17] ^[35] NewsGuard's CEO confirmed in correspondence that the Pentagon work was conducted for Cyber Command and focused on "identification and analysis of information operations targeting the US and its allies conducted by hostile governments" — including Russia and China — and that analysts specifically alerted officials in Ukraine about false narratives.^[19] By 2022, the Fingerprints database catalogued 1,122 flagged narratives and had been deployed at scale, including by social media companies.^[18]

Consortium News filed suit in federal court alleging that NewsGuard, operating under the contract, was acting jointly with the United States to coerce news organisations to alter viewpoints on Ukraine and Russia, imposing censorship of views that dissent from US policy.^[20] The lawsuit alleged outlets refusing to retract content faced retaliation through reliability ratings directly affecting advertising revenue and platform visibility.^[21] The defamation claims were dismissed at district court level in March 2025; the contractual relationship and its scope are not in dispute.^[22]

The NDAA for fiscal year 2024 included a provision restricting Pentagon spending on advertising agencies that employ NewsGuard, following congressional concern about the arrangement.^[23]

THE PENTAGON IMPOSED PRIOR RESTRAINT ON JOURNALISM — AND A COURT STRUCK IT DOWN

In September 2025, the Department of Defense issued a directive requiring credentialed journalists at the Pentagon to sign a pledge to refrain from reporting any information — including unclassified information — that had not been approved for release by an authorising official. Journalists who declined faced credential revocation.^[24] ^[25] ^[32] Dozens of correspondents refused to sign and were forced to surrender their press badges. The New York Times sued the Department of Defense in December 2025. The Society of Professional Journalists described the policy as prior restraint — “the most egregious violation of press freedom under the First Amendment.”^[26]

In March 2026, US District Judge Paul Friedman ruled the Pentagon's press restrictions unconstitutional, finding violations of the First and Fifth Amendments.^[27] ^[32]

Prior restraint is the legal term for government prohibition of publication before it occurs. It is the primary preemptive mechanism this report documents platforms applying to global voices throughout the period covered. The US government applied it directly to its own press corps within that same period — and required a federal court order to stop it. This mechanism is not the only one. Global blanketed, or population, regionally, ethnically, religiously, or ideologically focused, suppression, disparate from waves of suppression surrounding incidents or information of import, regardless of the imposing nation, must be classified separately as its own criminal conduct within the framework of cultural genocide, lest one, both, or others survive; or, are supplanted, superseded, or otherwise replaced with methodologies not yet known to the world. The solution must leave room for unknown future concepts, methods, and misrepresentations to prevent disaster for global human rights; even in their currently fractured form.

WHAT THIS ESTABLISHES

Evidence	Source	What It Establishes
DARPA SMISC + INCAS + Civil Sanctuary, 2011–2022	Federal solicitations; DARPA.mil; 200+ published papers	US military built and continuously funded the suppression methodology across a decade
Pentagon fake account network, 2012–2022; continued post-exposure	Graphika/SIO; Twitter Files; Meta; Intercept April 2026	Platforms actively assisted US military covert accounts; removed civilian wartime voices simultaneously; network persisted after exposure

Government-platform formal system: FBI, CISA, CIA, State, DoD, HHS, ODNI	Twitter Files Parts 1, 6, 9, 11, 12; DHS/CISA documents; EIP report	A documented multi-agency formal infrastructure for routing moderation requests existed across every major platform
Missouri v. Biden — district court 155pp ruling + Fifth Circuit affirmation, 2023	US District Court + 5th Circuit Court of Appeals	Two federal courts found government officials likely coerced platform moderation decisions; factual record not disturbed by Supreme Court
DOJ consent decree, March 2026	US Department of Justice; NCLA; Judge Terry Doughty	Ten-year prohibition on three agencies threatening platforms to suppress protected speech; binding legal constraint, no admission of past wrongdoing
NewsGuard contract, \$749,387, 2021–2023; NDAA 2024 restriction	DoD contract records; Cyber Command correspondence; Congressional record	Pentagon paid a private firm to catalogue and flag dissenting Ukraine/Russia coverage; Congress subsequently restricted the arrangement
Pentagon press restrictions, September 2025; court ruling March 2026	DoD directive; US Press Freedom Tracker; Judge Paul Friedman ruling	US government imposed prior restraint on journalism and required a federal court order to reverse it

The document's current framing — that platform suppression outcomes are consistent with US geopolitical interests — is no longer inferential. It is documented.

PART III — THE UKRAINIAN CASE

Named Individuals, Organisations, and Platforms: A Documented Record of
Suppression, 2014–2026

This section documents only what escaped the platforms — into journalism, NGO reports, government correspondence, academic research, and third-party platforms. The true scale is orders of magnitude larger than what is recorded here. This is a floor, not a ceiling.

THE PATTERN BEFORE THE CASE

The nations and populations documented above are not a preamble to the Ukrainian case that follows. They are the context that makes the Ukrainian case legible.

What happened to Ukrainian, pro-Ukrainian, and factual war-documentation voices across every major platform from 2014 to 2026 did not happen in isolation. It happened inside a system that had already spent years suppressing Tigray, Palestine, Cuba, Venezuela, Belarus, Myanmar, and dozens of others. A system that had demonstrated, repeatedly, that it would permit coordinated inauthentic activity against targeted voices and classify the documentation of atrocities as policy violations while leaving the perpetrators' content untouched.

The Ukraine case is the most extensively documented instance of this system in operation. It is documented in this depth because Ukrainian civil society, journalism, government, and international institutions fought to document it. Most of the populations listed above did not have that infrastructure. Their suppression is proportionally less documented. It was not proportionally less severe.

What you are about to read is not a special case. It is a case that was documented thoroughly enough to be read.

READING THE DATABASE

Each entry in the named individuals table uses colour-coded badges to identify the platforms involved and the suppression methods applied. Multiple badges per entry indicate multiple platforms or methods. The expanded case profiles that follow the table provide full narrative context for cases of particular significance.

PLATFORM KEY

F Facebook	I Instagram
X Twitter / X	T TikTok
Y YouTube	P Patreon
A Apple App Store	TG Telegram

SUPPRESSION METHOD KEY

SUS Account suspended / deleted	SHB Shadowban / ghost ban
DEM Demonetised	RCH Reach reduced without notification
PST Post / content removed	HTG Hashtag blocked
FTR Feature restricted	ADV Advertising cancelled
BAN Permanently banned — no reinstatement	

NAMED INDIVIDUALS — MASTER TABLE

43 named individuals documented across Twitter/X, Meta (Facebook/Instagram), YouTube, Patreon, and Apple App Store. Ordered by significance, then chronology. Expanded profiles follow for cases of particular significance.

Name / Handle	Role / Sphere	Platform(s)	Suppression Method(s)	Date
Zelenskyy Presidential Account (+ associated accounts)	Official Ukrainian presidential social media	X	SHB FTR	Jun 2023
Ukrainian Armed Forces Strategic Communications	Official Ukrainian military strategic communications department	Y	PST FTR	Oct 2023
Ambassador Yevhen Perebyinis	Ukrainian Ambassador to Czech Republic — post deleted for criticising Putin	F	PST	Jul 2021
Come Back Alive (Povernys' Zhyvym)	Ukraine's largest military charity; operational since 2014; 2,000+ drones funded	P	BAN	Feb 24, 2022
Andrius Tapinas	Lithuania's most influential journalist; 'People's Bayraktar' organiser (€5M+ raised in 3 days)	F P	SUS	Dec 2022 / Feb 2022
Azovstal Defenders' Families Association	Family advocacy group for Azov Regiment POWs held by Russia	I	BAN	Aug 2022
Azov Regiment Patronage Service ('Angels of Azov')	Official support service, Azov Regiment, Ukrainian National Guard	F I	SUS	Sep 2022
Anonymous Instagram user ('Where is Azov?' post)	Ordinary user; post called for return of 700+ Azov POWs — Oversight Board case #ig-1bmh3dq6	I	PST	Dec 2022
Roman Burko / InformNapalm @newsburko	Founder, InformNapalm OSINT (since 2014); contributed to GRU ID and MH17 investigation	X F	SUS BAN	Mar 2020 & Feb 2022
Kyle Glen @OsintBunker / @Conflicts	OSINT journalist, co-founder Conflict News (400K+ followers)	X	SUS	Feb 2022
Oliver Alexander @OAlexanderDK	OSINT analyst, security researcher (Denmark)	X	SUS	Feb 2022

Name / Handle	Role / Sphere	Platform(s)	Suppression Method(s)	Date
@NeuroneIntelligence	French-language OSINT platform (Switzerland)	X	SUS	Feb 2022
Mendo en Conflicto	Spanish-language conflict OSINT (Spain/Latin America)	X	SUS	Feb 2022
Notícias e Guerras	Brazilian Portuguese OSINT and conflict documentation	X	SUS	Feb 2022
@667_mancer	OSINT account; had debunked Russian false-flag claims days before invasion	X	SUS	Feb 2022
Yana Suporovska	Ukrainian journalist; volunteer fundraiser — raised 800,000 UAH for military drone	X	SUS	May-Jun 2022
Roman Sinitsyn	Activist; head of military direction, Serhiy Prytula Charitable Foundation	X	SUS	Apr-Jun 2022
Melania Podolyak	Activist; coordinator, Prytula Foundation Lviv	X	SUS	2022
Alisa Chirva	Volunteer; co-founder, Palyanytsia Foundation (military support charity)	X	SUS	2022
Maria Smirnova	Volunteer and military servicewoman	X	SUS	2022
Julia Napolska	Volunteer; SarTech project manager	X	SUS	2022
Olya Suprun @Ola_Bilo4ka	Blogger and volunteer	X	SUS	Jun 2022
Petro Nek	Blogger; CMO, Lviv Online — blocked for publishing Bucha photographs	X	SUS	Apr 2022
Oleg Novikov	Ukrainian journalist, co-host of 'Pravo na poplavu'	X	SUS	2022
Yevheniy Lira	Ukrainian writer, translator, documentary filmmaker ('The Grave of Shadows')	X	SUS	Dec 2021
Sergey Parkhomenko	Independent journalist — suspended for MH17 Russian responsibility reporting	F	SUS	May 2015

Name / Handle	Role / Sphere	Platform(s)	Suppression Method(s)	Date
Olga Tokariuk	Independent journalist (Chatham House, CEPA, Reuters Institute; TIME, WaPo, BBC, NPR)	X	SHB	Dec 2022
Ayder Muzhdabayev	Crimean Tatar journalist and blogger; prominent voice on Crimea occupation	P	SUS	2022
Ustyna Stefanchuk	Academic historian — account deleted for posting NKVD massacre site photographs	F	BAN	Jul 2021
Olena Pavlova (Inzhyr The Cat)	Comic creator; hundreds of thousands of followers — blocked for literary illustrations	F	SUS	Sep 2021
Jamala (+ wave of Ukrainian accounts)	Grammy and Eurovision-winning singer; hundreds of thousands of followers	X	SHB FTR	Jun 2023
Bohdan Gdal ('Na Teremkakh' admin)	Administrator, Kyiv community group (31,000 members) — permanently banned	F	BAN	Dec 2021
'Lyudonky, advise' Lviv community group	Community Facebook group, 360,000 members — permanently blocked, never restored	F	BAN	Jun 2021
Denys Davydov	Former Ukrainian commercial pilot; war analyst (400K→900K+ subscribers; 1.2B views)	Y	DEM	Oct 2022
Artur Rehi	Estonian military history and war analyst (500K+ subscribers)	Y	DEM	Oct 2022
Perun	Military analysis channel (~250K subscribers; 500K+ views per video)	Y	DEM	Oct 2022
'Reporting from Ukraine'	Anonymous Ukrainian war update creator — demonetised a month before the Oct 2022 wave	Y	DEM	Sep–Oct 2022
Jake Broe	US military veteran; geopolitics YouTuber (~250K subscribers); explicitly pro-Ukraine	Y	ADV	Oct 2022

Name / Handle	Role / Sphere	Platform(s)	Suppression Method(s)	Date
Vlad Vexler	Russian-born political philosopher, University of London	Y	ADV	Oct 2022
Šarūnas Jasiukevičius ('Praeities Žvalgas')	Lithuanian activist and Ukraine fundraiser — cyclic banning: 4–5 days free, then a month banned	F	BAN SUS	2022
Christo Komarnitski	Bulgarian political cartoonist, newspaper Sega (52,000+ followers)	F	FTR	Late 2022
Georgi Georgiev (BOEC)	Leader, Bulgarian civic movement BOEC — banned 50 times; over 3 years total ban time	F	SUS	2019–2023
Anonymous Ukrainian creator	YouTube content creator with no military connection — deleted for 'funding weapons'	P	BAN	Mar 2023

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

The following are direct, verbatim statements from individuals whose accounts, content, or organisations were suppressed. Each is attributed and sourced.

“My story started after I collected significant amounts. We collected money for a drone for a National Guard Special Forces unit. It was expensive, 800,000 UAH, but we succeeded. The first 12-hour ban was for my ironic reply. I sent an appeal, but it was declined. Then they targeted my old tweets, all of them. They even reported a tweet with a picture of me hugging my son on Mother's Day. Finally, claims reached the reply with the number of a credit card I used to collect money for the drone. Twitter assessed it as publishing personal information.”

Yana Suporovska, Ukrainian journalist and military fundraiser — AIN.ua, June 16, 2022

“Twitter blocked me again because they don't want people to see murders committed by Russians. No, the social network didn't block the accounts of the Russian propagandists and government officials who encouraged these atrocities; instead they blocked me and dozens of others who posted about it.”

Petro Nek, blogger and CMO, Lviv Online — Facebook post, April 5, 2022; Ukraïner (November 2022)

“For the first time in 6 years of war, Twitter blocked my account, for no apparent reason and with no explanation.”

Roman Burko, Founder, InformNapalm — InformNapalm.org, March 27, 2020

"The page was deleted without any warnings... at a very difficult time for Ukraine. It is unknown where more than \$250,000 went."

Taras Chmut, Director, Come Back Alive — CNBC, February 24, 2022. Source note: exact wording unverifiable against original CNBC article; the \$250,000 figure conflicts with \$300,000+ reported elsewhere from the same event. Reproduced as it appears in secondary sourcing.

"You have sold over 300,000 USD of your monthly donations to Ukraine. Yet, you hide behind your 'conditions and policies,' trying to explain that Patreon cannot be used to fund military activities... You have stopped vital funds for Ukraine and its people... You have helped war criminals. And helping war criminals certainly violates your conditions."

Andrius Tapinas, Lithuanian journalist — Open letter to Patreon, February 25, 2022

"I'm not inclined to believe in conspiracy theories. Probably they were blocking by keywords. Another question is how they are embedded in Facebook's algorithms — that's what's interesting."

Ustyna Stefanchuk, academic historian — Texty.org.ua, July 15, 2021

"I've been unblocked on Facebook for about four or five days lately, and then I'm blocked again for a month."

Šarūnas Jasiukevičius ('Praeities Žvalgas'), Lithuanian Ukraine fundraiser — Kauno diena, 2022

"In the last five years, my account has been banned exactly 50 times. In total, I have spent more than three years banned because of my activities with BOEC and our battles against the mafia and the Kremlin's fifth column."

Georgi Georgiev, leader of BOEC (Bulgaria) — RFERL Bulgarian Service, January 20, 2023

"Today @Denys Davydov and @Artur Rehi and others are reporting their entire channels have been demonetised for speaking about the war in Ukraine. I don't run ads on my channels, but I was informed today that an ad account associated with my channel [...] has been cancelled. This is unacceptable. We are talking about an extraordinary lack of transparency and accountability in our public square."

Vlad Vexler, political philosopher, University of London — YouTube community post, October 8, 2022

"The reasons for the block are, as always, abstract excuses about violating the rules without any specifics. We are convinced that the page takedowns are not fair."

Azov Regiment Patronage Service ('Angels of Azov') — Telegram announcement, September 2022

"The Russian invasion of Ukraine is internationally recognized as unlawful. The Board urges Meta to revise its policies to take into consideration the circumstances of unlawful military intervention."

Meta Oversight Board — Case #fb-mbgotvn8, November 16, 2022

"Ukrainians are not asking for Facebook to give them free rein to abuse Russians on the internet. What they want is a clear policy that is fairly applied and lets users combat Russian narratives and not wake up to unexpected blocks or suspensions."

Igor Rozkladaj, CEDEM (Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, Ukraine) — Kyiv Independent, January 30, 2024

EXPANDED CASE PROFILES

The following profiles provide full narrative context for cases of particular significance. Each includes the suppression mechanism, broader context, and where available, first-person testimony and source documentation.

Yana Suporovska

X

Ukrainian journalist and military fundraiser, Kyiv

Yana Suporovska had been a Twitter user for over 13 years when coordinated reporting attacks began against her account in May 2022. She had been publicly fundraising for the Ukrainian military — collecting 800,000 UAH for a drone for a National Guard Special Forces unit — when the targeting began.

The mechanism she described was systematic: bot accounts would first provoke emotional responses, then report those responses. They escalated through her archive, reporting posts one by one. A photograph of her hugging her son on Mother's Day was reported. When she published a bank card number for drone donations, Twitter's automated systems classified it as publishing personal financial information and acted on it.

On 7 June 2022, having announced she had raised a further 400,000 UAH (approximately \$13,500) for the army, her account disappeared entirely. It was restored only after Ukrainian singer Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (Okean Elzy) publicly intervened.

Fellow journalist Olga Tokariuk wrote publicly: 'Yana's account was attacked after she posted about her efforts to raise money for Ukrainian defenders. It's not the first case that Ukrainian volunteers' accounts receive massive strikes and get banned by Twitter.'

"My story started after I collected significant amounts. We collected money for a drone for a National Guard Special Forces unit. It was expensive, 800,000 UAH, but we succeeded. The first 12-hour ban was for my ironic reply. I sent an appeal, but it was declined. Then they targeted my old tweets, all of them. They even reported a tweet with a picture of me hugging my son on Mother's Day. Finally, claims reached the reply with the number of a credit card I used to collect money for the drone. Twitter assessed it as publishing personal information."

Yana Suporovska — AIN.ua, June 16, 2022

Source: AIN.ua (June 16, 2022); TheStreet (June 8, 2022)

Petro Nek — Lviv Online

X

Blogger and digital media professional, Lviv

On 5 April 2022, Ukrainian journalist Petro Nek had his Twitter account blocked for publishing photographs of dead Ukrainian civilians in Bucha — images documenting a confirmed war crime site in the immediate aftermath of Russian withdrawal.

His account was blocked. Russian propagandists and government officials who had publicly encouraged and justified the actions that produced those bodies were not. The disparity was exact, documented, and public. Nek stated it plainly.

“Twitter blocked me again because they don't want people to see murders committed by Russians. No, the social network didn't block the accounts of the Russian propagandists and government officials who encouraged these atrocities; instead they blocked me and dozens of others who posted about it.”

Petro Nek — Facebook post, April 5, 2022; quoted in *Ukrainian* (November 2022)

Source: *Ukrainian* (November 2022)

Roman Burko / InformNapalm

X **F** Founder and Editor-in-Chief, InformNapalm OSINT community (since 2014)

InformNapalm is a volunteer OSINT community that has documented Russian military aggression since 2014. Its work has contributed directly to the identification of Russian GRU personnel and to MH17 investigations. Each of its Twitter accounts — Ukrainian-language and multiple foreign-language editions, each with 14,000+ followers — was simultaneously suspended twice in two years.

The first suspension came in March 2020, immediately after the publication of aerial photographs geolocating modern Russian military hardware in the Donbas. All accounts — every language, simultaneously — disappeared within hours of that publication. Facebook simultaneously applied an automatic 'fake' label to a related post. Accounts were restored after approximately two weeks, following intervention by Ukrainian and foreign diplomats. Twitter acknowledged no specific error.

The second suspension came on 23 February 2022 — the eve of Russia's full-scale invasion — alongside every other major OSINT account tracking Russian military movements. Twitter again described this as error. No structural change followed either acknowledgment.

“For the first time in 6 years of war, Twitter blocked my account, for no apparent reason and with no explanation. The only thing that comes to mind is that it is a mighty assault of Russian trolls caused by this last tweet about the Russian radio-electronics-equipped military vehicles in the Donbas.”

Roman Burko — InformNapalm.org, March 27, 2020

Source: InformNapalm.org (March 27, 2020); *Ukrainian* (November 2022); *Sunday Guardian Live* (February 27, 2022)

Come Back Alive (Povernys' Zhyvym)

P Ukraine's largest military charity; operational since 2014

Come Back Alive is Ukraine's largest military charity. It is legally licensed to purchase military and dual-use goods. By February 2022, it had funded over 2,000 military drones, 5,290 demining kits, more than 60 military vehicles, and training for 350 snipers and over 2,000 sappers. It had 40 staff and 100 volunteers.

On 24 February 2022 — the first day of Russia's full-scale invasion — the organisation's Patreon page went viral internationally. Hundreds of thousands of people attempted to donate. Patreon suspended the page within hours.

All ongoing donations were frozen. The funds that had already come in — over \$300,000, with some reports citing \$430,000+ at the moment of suspension — became inaccessible. Patreon's stated justification: the platform does not allow campaigns involved in violence or purchasing military equipment, regardless of cause. No provision existed for wartime context. No provision existed for a legally constituted national military charity operating in an active invasion. The funds were ultimately refunded to donors rather than disbursed to the charity.

Lithuanian journalist Andrius Tapinas published an open letter to Patreon the following day. Come Back Alive's director Taras Chmut spoke to CNBC.

"The page was deleted without any warnings... at a very difficult time for Ukraine. It is unknown where more than \$250,000 went."

Taras Chmut, Director, Come Back Alive — CNBC, February 24, 2022. Source note: exact wording unverifiable against original CNBC article; \$250,000 figure conflicts with \$300,000+ reported elsewhere from the same event. Reproduced as it appears in secondary sourcing.

Source: CNBC (February 24, 2022); CoinDesk (February 25, 2022); Lithuania Tribune (February 26, 2022)

Andrius Tapinas — Open Letter to Patreon

F **P** Lithuania's most influential public figure; organiser of 'People's Bayraktar' campaign (€5M+ raised in 3 days)

Andrius Tapinas is described by Delfi (2023 poll) as the most influential public figure in Lithuania. He runs Freedom TV on YouTube and organised the 'People's Bayraktar' fundraising campaign, which raised over €5 million in three days to purchase a Bayraktar TB2 drone for Ukraine.

When Patreon suspended Come Back Alive on the first day of the invasion, Tapinas published an open letter that circulated internationally. His Facebook account was separately blocked in December 2022 for a post promoting Ukraine fundraising.

His Patreon letter remains one of the most direct public statements made to any platform about the consequences of these policies.

"You have sold over 300,000 USD of your monthly donations to Ukraine. Yet, you hide behind your 'conditions and policies,' trying to explain that Patreon cannot be used to fund military activities... You have stopped vital funds for Ukraine and its people... You have helped war criminals. And helping war criminals certainly violates your conditions."

Andrius Tapinas — Open letter to Patreon, February 25, 2022; Lithuania Tribune (February 26, 2022)

Source: Lithuania Tribune (February 26, 2022); LRT English (December 23, 2022); Debunk.org study (February 2023)

Ustyna Stefanchuk

F Academic historian, Ukraine

In July 2021, Ustyna Stefanchuk's entire Facebook account was immediately deleted after she posted historical photographs of the NKVD massacre site in Lviv, 1941 — Soviet-era atrocity documentation. She had previously received warnings for posts supporting Ukrainian defenders and posts about Independence Day celebrations.

Her account was restored following public outcry. Facebook gave no explanation for the deletion. Stefanchuk's analysis of what happened is notable for its precision: she did not attribute it to malice, but to a keyword classification system whose design she identified as the actual problem.

"I'm not inclined to believe in conspiracy theories. Probably they were blocking by keywords. Another question is how they are embedded in Facebook's algorithms — that's what's interesting."

Ustyna Stefanchuk — Texty.org.ua, July 15, 2021

Source: Texty.org.ua (July 15, 2021)

Denys Davydov

Y

Former Ukrainian commercial pilot; war analyst (400,000 subscribers at time of demonetisation; now 900,000+, 1.2 billion combined views)

Denys Davydov lost his job as a commercial pilot for Ukraine International Airlines when Russia's full-scale invasion grounded Ukraine's aviation industry. He had been building a YouTube channel covering Ukrainian aviation and the war. By October 2022 it had approximately 400,000 subscribers and individual videos regularly reached one million views. He relied on the income to support his family.

On 8 October 2022, YouTube demonetised his entire channel. The notification he received cited: 'Due to the war in Ukraine, we pause monetisation of content that exploits, dismisses, or condones the war.' His content does none of those things. It is factual, analytical, and explicitly pro-Ukraine.

The same notification went to Artur Rehi (Estonia), Perun, 'Reporting from Ukraine,' Jake Broe, and Vlad Vexler on the same day. 'Reporting from Ukraine' had already been in unsuccessful dialogue with YouTube for a month before the wave hit. The demonetisation was ultimately reversed.

Source: TechSparx/David Herron (October 8, 2022)

Kakhovska HPP Shadowban Wave — June 2023

X

Multiple Ukrainian accounts including Jamala and the presidential account

On 6 June 2023, Russian forces destroyed the Kakhovska Hydroelectric Power Plant, flooding the Kherson region. On 7–8 June, multiple Ukrainian accounts posting about the destruction were simultaneously shadowbanned on X (Twitter).

The mechanism was specific and targeted: accounts disappeared from search results when X's interface language was set to English — the international audience — but remained visible when the interface was set to Ukrainian. The suppression selectively targeted the international reach of Ukrainian voices at the moment of maximum global significance.

Affected accounts included singer Jamala (hundreds of thousands of followers) and accounts with fewer than 100 followers. The pattern was identified by Ukrainian volunteer 'Beamster.' Posts about the HPP destruction were also marked 'sensitive content' — a tag switched off by default, requiring over a minute of settings navigation to disable.

On the same day, X owner Elon Musk retweeted a Tucker Carlson video suggesting Ukraine was responsible for the explosion.

In April 2023, when a portion of X's recommendation algorithm source code leaked to GitHub, product manager Aakash Gupta identified that content tagged 'Ukraine Crisis' was placed in the same automated downgrade tier as content tagged 'Misinformation,' 'Violence,' and 'Misleading.' This was the first documentary evidence of the suppression mechanism at the code level.

Source: IMI (June 8, 2023); Gizmodo (April 3, 2023); Sundries.com.ua (June 8, 2023); Detector Media

#bucha / #buchamassacre — Facebook and Instagram

F

I

Platform-wide hashtag suppression

On 3 April 2022, Ukrainian journalist Olena Dub (@OlenaDub) publicly identified that the hashtag #bucha had been blocked on Instagram and Facebook. Two days after Russian forces withdrew from Bucha, revealing mass civilian killings — a site that would become central to international documentation of Russian war crimes — the primary hashtag being used to share that documentation was automatically blocked.

Users attempting to post documentation under #bucha or #buchamassacre had their content blocked. The hashtags were suppressed at the moment of maximum international attention to a confirmed war crime site.

Meta spokesperson Andy Stone confirmed: 'This happened automatically because of the graphic content people posted using these hashtags. When we were made aware of the issue yesterday, we acted quickly to unblock the hashtags.'

The Debunk.org/Vilnius University study found that in Lithuania alone, 3 of the 8 Facebook content restriction cases documented in April 2022 — the peak month — were directly related to users sharing photographs of the Bucha massacre.

Source: Euronews/Reuters (April 5, 2022); Debunk.org/Vilnius University study (February 2023)

Georgi Georgiev — BOEC (Bulgaria)

F

Leader, Bulgaria United With One Purpose civic movement

Georgi Georgiev leads BOEC, the Bulgarian civic movement that organised the anti-government protests of 2020 and Ukraine-support actions from 2022 onward. Over five years, his Facebook account was banned 50 times. The total cumulative time he spent banned exceeds three years.

In January 2023, BOEC organised a protest outside the Sofia headquarters of TELUS International Bulgaria — the Canadian company contracted by Meta to moderate Facebook content for Bulgarian users — under the slogan 'The Blocked are Blocking.' Georgiev spraypainted a 'Z' (the symbol of Russia's invasion) on the sidewalk outside the company's offices.

He was among a documented wave of Bulgarian pro-Ukrainian writers, poets, journalists, and activists who faced simultaneous restrictions, all with pro-Western or pro-Ukraine orientations.

"In the last five years, my account has been banned exactly 50 times. In total, I have spent more than three years banned because of my activities with BOEC and our battles against the mafia and the Kremlin's fifth column."

Georgi Georgiev — RFERL Bulgarian Service / Georgi Angelov, January 20, 2023

Source: RFERL Bulgarian Service (January 20, 2023); Euractiv

Meta Oversight Board — 'Russian Poem' Case (Latvia)

F

Facebook user in Latvia; Oversight Board case #fb-mbgotvn8

In April 2022, a Facebook user in Latvia posted an image of a body face-down in a Bucha street — confirmed by Meta to the Oversight Board as authentic — alongside Russian text drawing parallels between the Russian army's actions and Nazi atrocities in WWII. The post quoted Soviet poet Konstantin Simonov's poem 'Kill him! Kill him! Kill!' as a rhetorical device — a warning about historical cycles of violence, not an incitement to it.

Meta removed the post for 'Hate Speech.' After the Oversight Board selected the case, Meta restored the post but then applied a 'Violent and Graphic Content' warning screen to it. The Board overturned both the original removal and the warning screen.

The Board's decision included a finding that has direct bearing on the entire pattern documented in this database: 'The Russian invasion of Ukraine is internationally recognised as unlawful. The Board urges Meta to revise its policies to take into consideration the circumstances of unlawful military intervention.'

Meta did not implement the recommendation.

"The Russian invasion of Ukraine is internationally recognised as unlawful. The Board urges Meta to revise its policies to take into consideration the circumstances of unlawful military intervention."

Meta Oversight Board — Case #fb-mbgotvn8, November 16, 2022

Source: oversightboard.com/news/485045113689422

NAMED ORGANISATIONS AND MEDIA OUTLETS

Organisation	Role / Sphere	Platform(s)	Suppression Method(s)	Date
Channel 5 (Kanal 5)	Ukrainian national broadcaster	F	BAN	Jun 2022
Hromadske Radio and TV	Major Ukrainian independent non-profit news broadcaster (founded 2013)	F	SUS RCH	2022
Liga.net	One of Ukraine's largest media organisations (news, business, legal)	F	SUS	2022-2023
Groont	Ukrainian news media outlet	F	PST	Jul 2022
Ukrainska Pravda	Ukraine's most-visited online news media (founded 2000)	F	RCH DEM	2022-2023
DOU.ua	Major Ukrainian technology media outlet	F	RCH DEM	2022-2023
'Kyiv Not Kiev'	English-language advocacy page (Ukrainian spelling of capital)	F	BAN	Apr 2022
Poltavska Khvyliia	Regional online news outlet, Poltava Oblast	F	PST ADV	Dec 2022
Ukrainian military pages (5 named)	Infantry Day (27K), Ukrainian Military News (150K), Fortification (28K), + 2 others	F	BAN	2021

Organisation	Role / Sphere	Platform(s)	Suppression Method(s)	Date
'Lyudonky, advise' — Lviv group	Community Facebook group, 360,000 members	F	BAN	Jun 2021
'Na Teremkakh' — Kyiv group	Kyiv community group, 31,000 members	F	BAN	Dec 2021
Association of Azovstal Defenders' Families	Family advocacy group for Azov Regiment POWs	I	BAN	Aug 2022
Azov Regiment Patronage Service	Official support service, Ukrainian National Guard	F I	SUS	Sep 2022
Alty / RKIN App	Ukrainian app tracking Russian military casualties + air raid alerts	A	FTR	2022


GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTERS — QUANTIFIED DATA

LITHUANIA — 131 Documented Cases (February-December 2022)

The Debunk.org/Vilnius University study is the only fully quantified national dataset on pro-Ukrainian content suppression. It covers one small country over ten months. Even a handful of official cases is sufficient to establish population-scale suppression; 131 cases in Lithuania alone makes the scale undeniable.



Stated reasons for Facebook restrictions — Lithuania 2022



131 total cases	Documented Facebook restrictions on pro-Ukrainian content in Lithuania, Feb-Dec 2022
76 of 131	Cited 'hate speech' as reason — including standard Lithuanian-language terms for Russian forces
57 of 131	30-day bans — the most common duration
3 of 8 April cases	Directly related to sharing photographs of the Bucha massacre
4 of 131	Reversed by Facebook on appeal — 127 incorrect bans upheld
€53.8 million	Aid raised via Facebook by Lithuanian public figures — disrupted by content restrictions

UKRAINE — NATIONAL PATTERN (CEDEM, October 2023)

57 organisations	Ukrainian media organisations studied by CEDEM
27 of 57 (47.4%)	Had faced Facebook or Instagram restrictions since February 2022
92%	Success rate for CEDEM appeals in the 'Disinformation' category
60%	Overall appeal success rate — meaning more than half of all bans were incorrectly applied during an active war

BULGARIA — DOCUMENTED WAVE (January 2023)

A documented wave of Bulgarian pro-Ukrainian writers, poets, journalists, and activists with pro-Western outlooks faced simultaneous Facebook account restrictions. The content moderating company was TELUS International Bulgaria, a Canadian subsidiary contracted by Meta. In January 2023, dozens protested outside TELUS International Bulgaria's headquarters in Sofia under the slogan 'The Blocked are Blocking.'

HASHTAG AND CONTENT-LEVEL SUPPRESSION

The following cases document suppression that operated at the platform infrastructure level — affecting all users of a hashtag or content type, not specific accounts.

#bucha / #buchamassacre — Facebook and Instagram

F I

PST HTG

Early April 2022

Following the discovery of mass civilian killings in Bucha after Russian withdrawal, documentation posted under these hashtags was automatically blocked. Meta spokesperson Andy Stone confirmed: 'This happened automatically because of the graphic content people posted using these hashtags.' Global documentation of a confirmed war crime site was suppressed at the moment of maximum international attention. First flagged publicly by Ukrainian journalist Olena Dub (@OlenaDub) on April 3, 2022.

#russiaisaterroriststate — Instagram

I

HTG RCH

June 2022

Ukrainians used this hashtag to document systematic Russian shelling of civilian buildings. Posts were not appearing in feeds. Ukrainians then shifted to #russiaterroriststate (without 'is') to bypass the restriction — the adaptation itself documents the suppression.

#BuchaMassacre, #Azov, #RussiasATerroristState, #StandWithUkraine — Instagram search

I

HTG

From April 2022

All four hashtags blocked from Instagram's search bar. Formally documented in European Parliament Written Question E-002411/2022 (MEP Tomáš Zdechovský, PPE, July 3, 2022), which asked the European Commission whether it planned to sanction Meta. The question stated explicitly: 'Victims of war are being silenced, blocked, or shadowbanned.'

Ukrainian-language terms for Russian forces — Facebook

F

SUS PST

2015–2022+

Words including moskali (Moscovites — a centuries-old Ukrainian term), rusnya, rashysty were classified as hate speech. Users were banned for using them in clearly journalistic or political contexts. Multiple bans were issued for quoting Taras Shevchenko's poetry, beginning in 2015 and continuing through the invasion. The Lithuanian Language Institute confirmed the equivalent Lithuanian terms are not slurs. The same pattern applied for over seven years with no structural correction.

Ukrainian-language documentary — language-specific block

Y

FTR

October 2023

YouTube blocked the Ukrainian-language version of a documentary on environmental damage from the Russian invasion, published by the Ukrainian Armed Forces Strategic Communications Department. The English-language version remained accessible. Source: Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024.

Come Back Alive fundraising links — YouTube

Y

PST

2023-2024

YouTube was deleting links to Come Back Alive (Ukraine's largest military charity), citing 'obscene pictures.' The same charity had been suspended from Patreon on invasion day 2022. Source: Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024.

THE MARKUP — INSTAGRAM STRUCTURAL SUPPRESSION

The Markup (February 25, 2024) conducted an empirical investigation into Instagram suppression using nearly 100 accounts over multiple weeks. It is the most rigorous independent documentation of Instagram's suppression mechanics published to date.

Captions silently deleted	Instagram deleted the text captions of posts containing certain hashtags without notifying the account holder. 'Instagram did not notify any of our accounts that the text of our posts had been altered.'
Hashtag suppression	A hashtag showing '100+ posts' in Instagram search would display 'No results found' when navigated to — affecting only some users; others browsed normally.
War content heavily demoted	Instagram 'heavily demoted nongraphic images of war' — factual conflict documentation was systematically pushed down without notification.
No appeal option	Users were 'not always shown the option to appeal' when content was removed.
Content removed for non-violations	Instagram 'deleted content for violating a specific guideline, but the content did not appear to violate said guideline.'
Reach drops without notice	Users experienced 'drops in reach or engagement without any notification that the visibility of their content might have been affected.'
Stories reach collapse	Multiple users reported Stories reach dropping from hundreds of thousands to thousands or hundreds — sudden, unexplained, with no recourse.

Source: The Markup — 'Demoted, Deleted, and Denied' (February 25, 2024). themarkup.org

PRE-INVASION HISTORY — 2014 TO FEBRUARY 2022

The pattern predates the 2022 invasion by nearly a decade. The following timeline establishes that Ukrainian content was being systematically suppressed across platforms long before the full-scale war made it internationally visible.

Date	Platform	Account / Content	Suppression Type	Source
2014	Facebook	Ukrainian accounts critical of Crimea annexation	Mass suspensions	Ukrainian; BBC
2015	Facebook	User quoting Taras Shevchenko poem	Account banned; classified hate speech	Ukrainian; Radio Svoboda
2015–2021	Facebook/Instagram	Multiple Ukrainian users; Ukrainian-language military terms	Repeated bans	Ukrainian
May 2015	Facebook	Sergey Parkhomenko — MH17 Russian responsibility	Account suspended	BBC Monitoring
2015–2019	Facebook	Ukrainian users broadly	No Ukrainian moderation team until 2019	Ukrainian; Texty.org.ua
July 2021	Facebook	Ukrainian military pages (5 named)	Pages deleted; acknowledged as mistakes — no structural change	Texty.org.ua
July 2021	Facebook	Ustyna Stefanchuk (NKVD massacre documentation)	Account deleted; restored after outcry	Texty.org.ua
July 2021	Facebook	Ambassador Yevhen Perebyinis	Post deleted for "hate speech" (criticism of Putin)	Texty.org.ua
Sep 2021	Facebook	Olena Pavlova (Inzhyr The Cat)	Account blocked for literary illustrations	Ukrainian
Dec 2021	Facebook	"Na Teremkakh" Kyiv community (31,000 members)	Page permanently banned	Ukrainian
Jun 2021	Facebook	"Lyudonky, advise" Lviv community (360,000 members)	Page permanently blocked	Ukrainian
Mar 2020	Twitter	InformNapalm (all accounts simultaneously)	All accounts blocked after publishing Russian military intelligence	InformNapalm.org
Dec 2021	Twitter	Yevheniy Lira (documentary filmmaker)	Account blocked	Ukrainian
Feb 23, 2022	Twitter	Glen, Burko, Alexander, NeuronIntelligence, Mendo, Notícias, @667_mancer	Mass simultaneous suspensions — invasion eve	Multiple

X (TWITTER) — DOCUMENTED SHADOWBANNING, 2022-2023

Olga Tokariuk — Ghost Ban (December 2022)

Olga Tokariuk is an independent Ukrainian journalist whose work has appeared in TIME, the Washington Post, BBC, and NPR. She is affiliated with Chatham House, CEPA, and the Reuters Institute. In December 2022, a colleague notified her that her account had been ghost-banned — invisible in Twitter search, confirmed via third-party tools. She had not been notified by the platform.

"A friend sent me this. Apparently, I'm in a 'ghost ban' by Twitter, whatever that means."
Olga Tokariuk — December 14, 2022; reported in Newsweek (December 14, 2022)

Kakhovska HPP Wave — Algorithm Source Code (June 2023 + April 2023)

When Russian forces destroyed the Kakhovska HPP on 6 June 2023, multiple Ukrainian accounts posting about it were simultaneously shadowbanned. Accounts disappeared from X search results in English-language interface mode while remaining visible in Ukrainian-language mode — suppressing international reach specifically. Posts were also marked 'sensitive content' by default, requiring over a minute of settings navigation to remove. In April 2023, a portion of X's recommendation algorithm source code leaked to GitHub. Product manager Aakash Gupta identified that content tagged 'Ukraine Crisis' was placed in the same automated downgrade tier as content tagged 'Misinformation,' 'Violence,' and 'Misleading.' This is the first documentary evidence of the suppression mechanism at the code level.

Accounts affected	Jamala (100,000s followers) to accounts with under 100 followers — simultaneously
Suppression target	International audience specifically (English-language interface)
Default behaviour	'Sensitive content' tag applied — switched off by default, requiring 60+ seconds of settings navigation
Code-level evidence	X's algorithm placed 'Ukraine Crisis' in same downgrade tier as 'Misinformation,' 'Violence,' 'Misleading'
Same day	X owner Elon Musk retweeted a video suggesting Ukraine was responsible for the HPP explosion

Sources: IMI (June 8, 2023); Gizmodo (April 3, 2023); Sundries.com.ua (June 8, 2023); New Voice of Ukraine (April 2, 2023)

MELITOPOL TELEGRAM ADMINISTRATORS — ARRESTED 2023, SENTENCED 2025

All six individuals below were arrested in a single FSB mass sweep on 20 August 2023 in Russian-occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. All were charged specifically for running pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels. Russian occupation forces simultaneously hacked the RIA Melitopol Telegram channel and used it to spread propaganda before the team could open a new one. These are the longest known sentences imposed by any Russian occupation court on social media content creators for running pro-Ukrainian channels.

Name	Channel	Sentence	Charges / Notes
Heorhiy Levchenko	RIA Melitopol	16 years maximum-security	State treason; incitement to extremism; organising informant network Arrested Aug 20, 2023. Sentenced Sep 2, 2025

Name	Channel	Sentence	Charges / Notes
Vladyslav Hershon	Melitopol Is Ukraine	15 years strict-regime	Espionage; terrorism-related offences (trial behind closed doors) Arrested Aug 20, 2023. Sentenced Sep 3, 2025
Yana Suvorova	Melitopol Is Ukraine	14 years low-security	'Directing HIMARS strikes on an FSB building' Age 19 at arrest. Sentenced Oct 23, 2025. Held at Taganrog SIZO-2 (torture facility)
Oleksandr Malyshev	Melitopol Is Ukraine	26 years — longest known sentence for running a pro-Ukrainian social media channel	'Terrorist act: launching a missile and bomb strike' Arrested Aug 20, 2023
Mark Kaliush	Associated channels	Compulsory psychiatric treatment (no criminal trial)	Used as additional instrument of suppression Arrested Aug 20, 2023
Anastasiia Hlukhovska	RIA Melitopol journalist	Whereabouts unknown as of September 2025	Not disclosed by Russian authorities Arrested Aug 20, 2023. Fate unknown

Sources: IPI; Kyiv Independent (September 4, 2025; October 24, 2025); RSF; IMI (2025–2026)

USAID COLLAPSE AND UKRAINE'S INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM (2025)

In February 2025, the US government froze USAID funding. The effect on Ukrainian independent media was structural and immediate — this is not a platform suppression case but a direct consequence of the same information ecosystem, and it is documented here because the outlets it destroyed were precisely those documenting platform suppression, Russian war crimes, and the events recorded in this database.

80–90%	of Ukrainian media outlets received USAID funding
100%	of income for some outlets
40–60%	of income for others
3–10%	Advertising revenue as share of income for Ukrainian regional media — all other income was donor aid
–20%	Projected further reduction in newspapers and magazines without donor aid
–25–30%	Projected drop in subscription circulation
~2/3	USAID grants as share of investigative journalist Denys Bihus's organisation's projects
62nd	Ukraine's ranking in RSF World Press Freedom Index 2025 — with the USAID freeze named as a key factor

400 million+

People globally who lost access to USAGM-funded reliable information when RFE/RL support was suspended simultaneously

Directly affected outlets: RIA Melitopol (operating in exile); Kordon Media (Sumy region, covering Russian border areas); Slobidskyi Kray (Kharkiv's oldest newspaper); Denys Bihus (investigative journalism). Kyiv Independent editor-in-chief Olga Rudenko: 'The freeze has caused harm to independent Ukrainian journalism on par with the COVID-19 pandemic and the onset of Russia's full-scale war.'

Sources: *Washington Post* (February 7, 2025); *RSF World Press Freedom Index 2025*; *The Conversation/University of Melbourne* (March 17, 2025); *Euronews* (June 19, 2025)

ANALYTICS DATASETS

The following datasets and published statistics are documented without platform API access. Each is sourced from published research, official transparency reports, or investigative journalism.

Cambridge/Kyiv School of Economics — Nature Communications (October 2024)

Kyrychenko, Brik, van der Linden, Roozenbeek. DOI: 10.1038/s41467-024-52179-8. Open access: PMC11445580.

1.6 million posts from Ukrainian and Russian news source pages on Facebook and Twitter, 4 timepoints August 2021 – September 2022.

Post-invasion ingroup solidarity — Facebook	+92% engagement vs pre-invasion baseline
Post-invasion ingroup solidarity — Twitter	+68% engagement vs pre-invasion baseline
Post-invasion outgroup hostility — Facebook	Weaker than pre-invasion
Post-invasion outgroup hostility — Twitter	Weaker than pre-invasion
Dataset	OSF: 10.17605/OSF.IO/RMC3E (open access)

CEDEM/Tsedem Study (October 2023)

Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, Ukraine. 57 Ukrainian media organisations.

Study of Meta platform restrictions on Ukrainian media since February 2022.

Organisations studied	57
Restricted by Facebook or Instagram since Feb 2022	27 (47.4%)

Appeal success — 'Disinformation' category	92%
Overall appeal success rate — year 1 of invasion	60% (meaning >50% of bans incorrectly applied)

Debunk.org / Vilnius University (February 2023)

Study period: February 24 – December 31, 2022. 131 documented restriction cases from Lithuanian Facebook users.

The only fully quantified national dataset on pro-Ukrainian content suppression.

Total cases	131
Most common duration	30 days (57 of 131)
Most common stated reason	"Hate speech" (76 of 131)
Peak month	April 2022 (8 cases — Bucha massacre period)
Bucha-related cases in April	3 of 8
Reversed on Facebook appeal	4 of 131
Aid raised via Facebook — disrupted	€53.8 million

The Markup Instagram Investigation (February 25, 2024)

themarkup.org — 'Demoted, Deleted, and Denied'

Empirical investigation using ~100 accounts over multiple weeks.

War content treatment	"Heavily demoted"
Post captions	Silently deleted when containing certain hashtags — no notification
Hashtag search	Shows '100+ posts' but displays 'No results found' when navigated to
Stories reach	Reported dropping from hundreds of thousands to hundreds without notice
Users interviewed	20 (including 4 journalists and 13 professional creator accounts)

European Parliament Written Question E-002411/2022 (July 3, 2022)

MEP Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE). europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002411_EN.html

Formal institutional record that the European Parliament was aware of Instagram blocking war-documentation hashtags.

Hashtags blocked	#BuchaMassacre, #Azov, #RussiansATerroristState, #StandWithUkraine
Platform	Instagram search bar
Commission asked	Whether it planned to sanction Meta
Question text	"Victims of war are being silenced, blocked, or shadowbanned"

ACADEMIC SOURCES

Authors / Year	Title	Journal	DOI / URL
Heřmanová, Eriksson Krutrök, Divon (2025)	The algorithm loves the war: ambivalent visibility in content creator practices during war	Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies	10.1080/10304312.2025.2507777
Kyrychenko, Brik, van der Linden, Roozenbeek (2024)	Social identity correlates of social media engagement before and after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine	Nature Communications 15, 8127	10.1038/s41467-024-52179-8
Divon & Eriksson Krutrök (2025)	The rise of war influencers: Creators, platforms, and the visibility of conflict zones	Journalism	10.1177/29768624251325721
Bösch & Divon (2024)	The sound of disinformation: TikTok, computational propaganda, and the invasion of Ukraine	New Media & Society	10.1177/14614448241251804
Badola (2023)	Russia and Ukraine: A Content Analysis of 'The World's First TikTok War'	University of Michigan thesis	deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/177317

CEDEM EXPERT TESTIMONY AND NSDC INITIATIVE (2023-2024)

Igor Rozkladaj — CEDEM (Ukraine)

Igor Rozkladaj is deputy director and social media expert at CEDEM (Ukraine's Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law). He works directly with Meta representatives and processes appeals on behalf of Ukrainian users. His testimony (Kyiv Independent, January 30, 2024; updated March 6, 2025) is the most authoritative first-hand account of what Meta's suppression of Ukrainian content looks like from inside the appeals process.

"Ukrainians are not asking for Facebook to give them free rein to abuse Russians on the internet. What they want is a clear policy that is fairly applied and lets users combat Russian narratives and not wake up to unexpected blocks or suspensions."

Igor Rozkladaj, CEDEM — Kyiv Independent, January 30, 2024

60%	Appeal success rate in year one of the full-scale invasion — meaning over half of bans were incorrectly applied
Whitelist recommendation	CEDEM formally recommended Meta implement a whitelist system for media organisations in conflict settings
Meta response	Not implemented
Shadow bans	Described by Article 19's Chantal Joris as 'far from a conspiracy theory but rather a common tool' — 'users are punished without knowing they did anything wrong and have no opportunity to appeal'

NSDC / Debunk.org Evidence Collection Initiative (January 2023)

In January 2023, Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council Center for Countering Disinformation, in cooperation with Debunk.org (Lithuania), began formally collecting evidence of pro-Ukrainian users whose accounts were removed for war-related publications. This is the first formal state-level acknowledgment that the problem was systematic enough to require dedicated evidence collection. Also in January 2023, Meta accepted Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation's request to exclude the Azov Regiment from its 'dangerous organisation' blocking policy — nearly a year after the 2022 Oversight Board case, and only after sustained Ukrainian government advocacy. In 2022, the Ministry formally asked Meta to publicly disclose a list of prohibited words defining hate speech. As of the 2023 Freedom House report, Meta had not complied.

Source: Freedom House, *Freedom on the Net 2023 (Ukraine section)*

PRIMARY SOURCES

#	Source	Title / Description	URL
1	Ukraïner	'Potentially Unacceptable' (Nov 17, 2022; updated Jun 3, 2024)	ukrainer.net/en/potentially-unacceptable/
2	Debunk.org / Vilnius University	Facebook content moderation inconsistencies in the context of war in Ukraine (Feb 13, 2023)	debunk.org/news/facebook-content-moderation-inconsistencies-war-ukraine
3	Texty.org.ua	Algorithm of the Ban (Jul 15, 2021)	texty.org.ua/articles/104034/
4	AIN.ua	Twitter and Facebook block Ukrainian activists. Again (Jun 16, 2022)	en.ain.ua/2022/06/16/twitter-and-facebook-block-ukrainian-activists/
5	TheStreet	Is Twitter Banning Ukrainian Activists? (Jun 2022)	thetstreet.com/technology/is-twitter-banning-ukrainian-activists

#	Source	Title / Description	URL
6	TechSparx / David Herron	Google demonetizing YouTubers reporting on Russia's war (Oct 8, 2022)	techsparx.com/google/youtube/google-demonetizing-youtubers-reporting-on-russias-war-against-ukraine.html
7	The Markup	Demoted, Deleted, and Denied (Feb 25, 2024)	themarkup.org/investigations/2024/02/25/demoted-deleted-and-denied
8	RFERL / Georgi Angelov	Pro-Ukrainian Facebook Users In Bulgaria Complain Of Accounts Being Blocked (Jan 20, 2023)	rferl.org/a/bulgaria-facebook-pro-ukrainian-blocked/32238393.html
9	Georgetown Free Speech Project	Twitter mistakenly removes OSINT accounts on invasion eve (Mar 18, 2022)	freespeechproject.georgetown.edu/tracker-entries/amid-ukraine-invasion-twitter-mistakenly-removes-accounts/
10	Sunday Guardian Live	Twitter suspends accounts reporting on Ukraine (Feb 27, 2022)	sundayguardianlive.com/technology/twitter-suspends-accounts-reporting-on-ukraine
11	Reclaimthenet.org	Twitter censoring posts documenting Russia's Ukraine invasion (Feb 24, 2022)	reclaimthenet.org/twitter-begins-censoring-posts-documenting-russias-ukraine-invasion
12	InformNapalm.org	For the First Time in Six Years, Twitter Blocked All InformNapalm Accounts (Mar 27, 2020)	informnapalm.org/en/for-the-first-time-in-six-years/
13	IMI (Institute of Mass Information)	Multiple reports 2022-2026	imi.org.ua/en
14	Meta Oversight Board	Case #ig-1bmh3dq6 (Dec 2023); Case #fb-mbgotvn8 (Nov 2022)	oversightboard.com/news/485045113689422
15	CNBC	Patreon suspends Come Back Alive page (Feb 24, 2022)	cnbc.com/2022/02/24/patreon-suspends-come-back-alive-a-ukrainian-military-charity.html
16	Lithuania Tribune	Lithuanian developers pull out of Patreon over Ukraine ban (Feb 26, 2022)	lithuaniatribune.com/90929/lithuanian-developers-pull-out-of-patreon-over-ukraine-ban/
17	LRT	Facebook blocking your Ukraine posts? (Dec 23, 2022)	lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1835447/facebook-blocking-your-ukraine-posts
18	Euronews	#bucha hashtag blocked on Facebook and Instagram (Apr 5, 2022)	euronews.com/next/2022/04/05/bucha-hashtag-is-being-blocked-by-facebook-and-instagram-heres-what-happened
19	Svidomi.in.ua	Does TikTok threaten national security? The case of Ukraine	svidomi.in.ua/en/post/does-tiktok-threaten-national-security-the-case-of-ukraine
20	CEDEM / Kyiv Independent	Social media giants' unbalanced fight with disinformation in Ukraine (Jan 30, 2024)	kyivindependent.com/social-media-giants-unbalanced-fight-with-disinformation-in-ukraine/
21	BBC Monitoring	Ukrainians petition Facebook against 'Russian trolls' (May 2015)	feeds.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32720965

#	Source	Title / Description	URL
22	TechCrunch	Twitter reinstates accounts sharing open source info on Russian military threat (Feb 23, 2022)	techcrunch.com/2022/02/23/twitter-reinstates-accounts-sharing-open-source-info-on-russian-military-threat/
23	Freedom House	Freedom on the Net 2023, 2024, 2025 — Ukraine	freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2024
24	European Parliament	Written Question E-002411/2022 (Jul 3, 2022)	europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002411_EN.html
25	Gizmodo	Musk's Twitter Downranks Twitter Spaces Regarding the 'Ukraine Crisis' (Apr 3, 2023)	gizmodo.com/twitter-spaces-ukraine-crisis-downranked-elon-musk-1850293018
26	Newsweek	Prominent Ukrainian Journalist Says She Was Ghost Banned on Twitter (Dec 14, 2022)	newsweek.com/twitter-ghost-ban-ukraine-journalist-olga-tokariuk-1766021
27	IPI	Russian forces detain administrators of RIA Melitopol Telegram channel	ipi.media/russian-forces-detain-administrators-of-ria-melitopol-telegram-channel/
28	Kyiv Independent	Melitopol Telegram administrator sentenced to 15 years (Sep 4, 2025)	kyivindependent.com/melitopol-telegram-channel-administrator-sentenced-to-15-years-in-russian-occupied-territory/
29	RSF	Trump's foreign aid freeze throws journalism around the world into chaos (Feb 3, 2025)	rsf.org/en/trump-s-foreign-aid-freeze-throws-journalism-around-world-chaos
30	Washington Post	Independent media in Russia, Ukraine lose funding with USAID freeze (Feb 7, 2025)	washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/07/ukraine-russia-usaid-media-journalism/
31	The Conversation / U. Melbourne	Local newspapers are a lifeline in Ukraine, but USAID cuts may force many to close (Mar 17, 2025)	theconversation.com/local-newspapers-are-a-lifeline-in-ukraine-but-usaid-cuts-may-force-many-to-close-250820
32	Babel.ua	RKIN app removed from App Store at Apple's request (Jul 2022)	babel.ua/texts/78234-apple-vy-dalya-z-app-store-zastosunok-rkin
33	Sundries.com.ua	Twitter automatically bans Ukrainians who often write about the war (Jun 8, 2023)	sundries.com.ua/twitter-automatically-bans-ukrainians-who-often-write-about-the-war/

AFTERWORD

Assessment and Legal Indictment

The following section presents the authors' assessment of what the documented record establishes, and the legal framework within which it must be understood.

AFTERWORD: ASSESSMENT AND LEGAL INDICTMENT

THE WEIGHT OF WHAT WAS BURIED

Every suppression documented in this report was already in force before 24 May 2026. The accounts were suspended. The hashtags were blocked. The reach was throttled. The pattern is not uniform in intensity: suppression has operated in distinct waves of severity, most acutely around moments where significant evidence could have reached the international public — the eve of the full-scale invasion, the discovery of the Bucha massacre, the destruction of the Kakhovska HPP, and repeatedly around the emergence of technical evidence implicating Western components in Russian weapons systems. The correlation between suppression intensity and the presence of damaging evidence is documented throughout this report. It is not coincidence.

On 22 May 2026, Ukrainian forces struck a target in Russian-occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff identified the target as the headquarters of the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies — Russia's elite drone unit, formed in 2024, which had operated alongside North Korean forces during the Kursk incursion. Russia declared the target a civilian student dormitory and organised curated media access through its Foreign Ministry. No independent verification was permitted. The casualty list undermined the Kremlin's framing immediately: 21 victims, predominantly young adults born between 2003 and 2008 — not children, as initially claimed. Orders concerning the transfer of dormitory premises to a military unit had been discoverable in Russian-language channels months before the strike. Local residents had discussed the presence of military personnel at the college and dormitory with consistency and specificity sufficient to constitute a documentary record. That record existed. It was suppressed. It was invisible to any international audience that did not already know to look for it and how to find it.

In the days following the strike, Russian channels circulated the faces of victims subsequently identified by Ukrainian researchers as Ukrainians killed by Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia Oblast in 2023. Russia dressed its own prior victims in the identity of new ones. The correction was documented and suppressed simultaneously. The disinformation circulated freely. This is not an anomaly. It is the operational standard that platform inaction made possible.

Two days later, on 24 May 2026, Russia struck Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast — 600 drones, 90 missiles, and the third operational use of the Oreshnik IRBM against a city of 200,000. The Oreshnik carries up to six independent hypersonic warheads, cannot be intercepted by any deployed system, and is capable of conventional or nuclear payload. No instrument at any distance can establish which it carries until detonation or impact.

The people of Bila Tserkva did not know what was coming. In the time between warning and impact — and in every moment before, throughout every previous strike of this war — their thoughts, opinions, art, grief, and record of existing had already been suppressed, deleted, or throttled below visibility. What they chose to share with the world in what may have been their final moments had been taken from them. Not by the missile. By the platforms. By choices made, and remade, and never corrected, for more than a decade before the warhead arrived.

THE FAILURE IS NOT ACCIDENTAL — AND THE SILENCING WAS DOUBLED

Doubt about whether Starobilsk was a legitimate military target is understandable. It is understandable because the suppression had already cleared the field. Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian sources posted the prior record — the orders, the resident testimony, the operational context of Rubicon. For anyone who did not specifically seek those sources and track them with sustained effort, knowing that their posts routinely failed to appear even in follower and subscriber feeds, that material did not exist. Russia's characterisation of the strike as a civilian atrocity entered a global information environment from which the counter-evidence had been pre-emptively removed. It did not prevail by persuasion. The suppression had already decided the contest.

The Zaporizhzhia victim-image operation succeeded by the same mechanism. Corrections reached those already watching carefully. Disinformation reached everyone else. This asymmetry — corrections suppressed, disinformation amplified — is not incidental to platform operations. It is their consistent documented output, most acute precisely when the evidence being suppressed is most damaging. The doubt that results is not the fault of those who hold it. It is the direct and documentable consequence of a suppression architecture built, maintained, and renewed across more than a decade.

THE GLOBAL DIMENSION: SUPPRESSION AS CULTURAL GENOCIDE

Ukraine is the most extensively documented case. It is not the only one. The suppression documented in this report encompasses national identity, language, historical memory, artistic expression, political dissent, and community organisation across more than one hundred nations. Platform systems amplified incitement in the Tigray genocide and removed the documentation of its violence. The same platforms enabled the Rohingya genocide and subsequently acknowledged it — after the fact, after the damage. Indigenous voices across Latin America, Africa, and Asia documenting land seizure and political violence have been suppressed without state pressure in the countries where those communities live. Regional languages and their cultural frameworks across Eastern Europe have been treated as hate speech while the languages of those seeking to erase them have not. The pattern is global, consistent, and unremedied.

This is the definition of cultural genocide. Raphael Lemkin — who coined the term and drafted the Convention — defined it as a coordinated plan aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups: their institutions, language, national feeling, and community infrastructure. The systematic removal of those foundations from the global information environment — across every continent, in dozens of languages, for more than two decades — is the largest act of cultural erasure conducted by private actors in recorded history. It has proceeded with the knowledge, regulatory tolerance, and in material respects the active facilitation of the states in which those actors are headquartered. The loss is permanent. The communities that sustained it did not consent. They received no notice, no recourse, and no remedy.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK THAT MUST CHANGE

The instruments required to condemn what is documented here already exist. None has been applied to platform suppression of populations subject to genocide or systematic cultural erasure. That gap is not an oversight. It is a structural failure exploited for more than two decades.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establish the right to receive and impart information through any media, and impose on states the obligation to protect that right from interference. States that have created the regulatory conditions under which these platforms built their suppression architectures have not fulfilled this obligation. Private platform autonomy is not a defence; it is a gap in international law that has been

deliberately left open.

Article II of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Article III makes complicity in genocide punishable. The systematic suppression of the voices of a population subject to genocidal assault — while permitting the voices of the perpetrators to operate without equivalent restriction — is complicity in the informational dimensions of that genocide. It degrades the international community's capacity to perceive and respond to the assault. It enables disinformation operations by removing the counter-voices that would contest them. After twelve years of documented, consistent, unremedied outcome, this is not negligent complicity. It is wilful. The distinction matters in law and in judgment.

Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity including persecution on national, ethnic, cultural, or political grounds. The cultural suppression documented here — the erasure of Ukrainian, Tigrinya, Rohingya, Lithuanian, Bulgarian, Armenian, and dozens of other linguistic and cultural communities from the global information environment — constitutes systematic cultural persecution across multiple platforms over more than two decades. Lemkin's formulation was its foundation, not a footnote: genocide aims at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups. The removal of those foundations from the global information space is that destruction, carried out at a scale no instrument of his era was designed to address. That gap is now a wound in the historical record of every population in this report.

THE DEMAND

The law must change. Not as a recommendation. Not as a basis for negotiation with platforms about voluntary compliance frameworks that will be announced and abandoned. It must change in a way that removes every shelter and establishes without ambiguity that the systematic suppression of the voices of populations subject to genocide, occupation, or unlawful military aggression constitutes participation in genocide — direct where suppression is coordinated with the aggressor, complicit where it operates to the same effect through sustained inaction. The standard must not require proof of intent. Twelve years of consistent, documented, unremedied outcome is the proof. Outcome is the verdict.

The states these platforms answer to bear proportional responsibility. Corporate form does not dissolve the relationship between a state's regulatory choices and the global outcomes those choices produce. The argument that private platforms are not state actors provides no cover for states that spent two decades creating the conditions under which those platforms built suppression architectures producing outcomes consistent with those states' geopolitical interests. The consistency is documented. The regulatory choices that enabled it are documented. The failure to correct it is documented.

The population of Bila Tserkva was looking at the sky on the night of 24 May 2026. Whatever they thought, felt, created, or tried to share with the world in that moment and in all the moments before it — the platforms had already decided how much of it the world would see. If humanity does not act to ensure that decision can never again be made by private actors without accountability or consequence, the information environment that produced this erasure will not merely continue. It will tighten. Nation after nation will find that their culture, history, and right to be known cannot survive suppression systems they never consented to and cannot escape. No nation will claw its way out of absolute information control no matter how desperately it desires freedom — because the mechanisms of that control will have been normalised, legalised by inaction, and embedded in the infrastructure of every communication platform on which human life depends.

That is the future this report documents the approach of. It is not hypothetical. It is the present, extended forward.

There is no quarter. There should be none.

This document was compiled by the Dystopia Prevention Bureau, May 2026. All factual claims regarding suppression events are sourced and documented in the preceding sections of this report. The legal analysis constitutes the authors' assessment. It is not offered as legal advice. It is offered as a verdict.

APPENDIX

Consolidated Sources

All source references for every section of this document, organised by part. URLs are provided in full plain text so that document and page titles remain visible and consultable even if links become unavailable.

APPENDIX — CONSOLIDATED SOURCES

This appendix contains every source reference for every section of this document, organised by part. URLs are given in full plaintext so that document and page titles remain visible and searchable even if links become unavailable. Reference numbers correspond to inline citations in each section.

PART II — THE UNITED STATES: DOCUMENTED STATE PROXIMITY [1]-[35]

Source titles are cited in their original language.

Ref	Source	Title / Description	Date	URL
[1]	Federal Register	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency — Social Media in Strategic Communication BAA-11-64	July 14, 2011	federalregister.gov/documents/2011/07/14/2011-17666/defense-advanced-research-projects-agency-social-media-in-strategic-communication
[2]	DARPA	Social Media in Strategic Communication (SMISC) — Official Program Page (archived)	2011-2015	arpa.mil/research/programs/social-media-in-strategic-communication
[3]	Grants.gov	Social Media in Strategic Communication (SMISC) — Solicitation oppld=183411	2011	grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppld=183411
[4]	Information Professionals Association	The Story Behind the DARPA SMISC Program — program retrospective by original programme manager	2019	information-professionals.org/the-darpa-social-media-in-strategic-communication-smisc-program/
[5]	IDSTCH.com	DARPA SMISC and Military Information Support Operations — programme analysis	February 7, 2019	idstch.com/technology/ict/darpa-using-mind-control-techniques-manipulate-social-media/
[6]	Stanford Internet Observatory / Graphika	Unheard Voice: Evaluating Five Years of Pro-Western Covert Influence Operations	September 2022	graphika.com/reports/unheard-voice
[7]	Washington Post	The Pentagon's alleged fake social media accounts demand a reckoning — opinion	September 20, 2022	washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/09/20/military-pentagon-fake-social-media/
[8]	VOA News / GlobalSecurity.org	Meta Report: US Military Behind Online Influence Campaign Targeting Central Asia, Middle East	November 23, 2022	globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2022/intell-221123-voa02.htm
[9]	Al Jazeera / Lee Fang	Twitter secretly boosted US psyops in Middle East — Twitter Files Part 8	December 21, 2022	aljazeera.com/amp/economy/2022/12/21/twitter-secretly-boosted-us-military-propaganda-investigation
[10]	Alternet	Pentagon demands audit of fake social media accounts used in psychological operations	December 2, 2022	alternet.org/2022/09/pentagon-fake-social-media-accounts
[11]	US District Court, Western District of Louisiana	Missouri v. Biden — Memorandum Ruling, 579 F. Supp. 3d 630 (W.D. La. 2023)	July 4, 2023	courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Missouri-v-Biden-complaint.pdf
[12]	US Supreme Court	Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. ____ (2024) — Opinion of the Court	June 26, 2024	supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-411_3dq3.pdf
[13]	Missouri Attorney General	Missouri Leads In First Amendment Victory — official statement	March 25, 2026	ago.mo.gov/missouri-leads-in-first-amendment-victory/
[14]	CBS News	Supreme Court rejects challenge to Biden administration's contacts with social media companies	June 26, 2024	cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-biden-social-media-censorship-case/

[15]	US Department of Justice	Justice Department Settles Lawsuits Challenging Biden Administration's Alleged Social Media Coercion	March 25, 2026	justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-settle-s-lawsuits-challenging-biden-administration-s-alleged-social-media
[16]	New Civil Liberties Alliance	NCLA Reaches Historic Settlement — consent decree announcement	March 24, 2026	nclalegal.org/press_release/ncla-reaches-historic-settlement-strikes-major-blow-against-governments-social-media-censorship/
[17]	Breitbart News	NewsGuard, Recipient of \$750k Pentagon Contract, Denies It Is Government Funded	March 13, 2023	breitbart.com/tech/2023/03/13/newsguard-recipient-of-750k-pentagon-contract-denies-it-is-government-funded/
[18]	Washington Times	Inside the Ring: 'Misinformation' service NewsGuard targeted in defense bill	December 13, 2023	washingtontimes.com/news/2023/dec/13/inside-ring-misinformation-service-newsguard-target/
[19]	Racket News / Matt Taibbi	NewsGuard Case Highlights the Pentagon's Censorship End-Around	October 25, 2023	racket.news/p/newsguard-case-highlights-the-pentagons
[20]	Washington Times	Media monitoring company NewsGuard sued for defamation, helping feds violate free speech rights	October 30, 2023	washingtontimes.com/news/2023/oct/27/media-monitoring-company-newsguard-sued-for-defama/
[21]	Courthouse News	NewsGuard Motion to Dismiss Ruling — Case 1:23-cv-07088-KPF	March 26, 2025	courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/newsguard-motion-to-dismiss-ruling.pdf
[22]	Reason	Federal judge tosses defamation lawsuit against NewsGuard	March 27, 2025	reason.com/2025/03/27/federal-judge-tosses-defamation-lawsuit-against-newsguard/
[23]	Washington Examiner	Inside the GOP's tense negotiations with Democrats to ban Pentagon-funded 'censorship'	December 11, 2023	washingtonexaminer.com/news/2439614/inside-the-gops-tense-negotiations-with-democrats-to-ban-pentagon-funded-censorship/
[24]	Federal News Network	Pentagon steps up media restrictions, now requiring approval before reporting even unclassified info	September 22, 2025	federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-news/2025/09/pentagon-steps-up-media-restrictions-now-requiring-approval-before-reporting-even-unclassified-info/
[25]	Military.com / AP	Pentagon Steps up Media Restrictions, Now Requiring Approval Before Reporting Even Unclassified Info	September 21, 2025	military.com/daily-news/2025/09/21/pentagon-steps-media-restrictions-now-requiring-approval-reporting-even-unclassified-info.html
[26]	Society of Professional Journalists / MTSU First Amendment Center	Pentagon tightens news media restrictions — SPJ statement cited	September 20, 2025	firstamendment.mtsu.edu/post/pentagon-tightens-news-media-restrictions-now-requiring-approval-before-reporting-even-unclassified-info/
[27]	MTSU First Amendment Encyclopedia	Pentagon Rules for the Press, 2025 — federal court ruling March 2026	March 2026	firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/pentagon-rules-for-the-press/
[28]	The Intercept / Lee Fang	Twitter Aided the Pentagon in Its Covert Online Propaganda Campaign (Twitter Files Part 8)	December 20, 2022	theintercept.com/2022/12/20/twitter-dod-us-military-accounts/
[29]	The Intercept	These Middle Eastern News Sites Are Actually US Government Propaganda Operations — network continued post-exposure	April 20, 2026	theintercept.com/2026/04/20/pentagon-middle-eastern-news-propaganda-iran/

[30]	Matt Taibbi / Racket News	Capsule Summaries of all Twitter Files Threads — Parts 1, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12: FBI, CIA, DoD, State, ODNI formal system	January 2023	racket.news/p/capsule-summaries-of-all-twitter
[31]	The Intercept	Leaked Documents Outline DHS Plans to Police Disinformation — CISA, EIP, Stanford, monthly platform meetings	October 31, 2022	theintercept.com/2022/10/31/social-media-disinformation-dhs/
[32]	US Press Freedom Tracker	Pete Hegseth restricts journalists' access inside Pentagon — full timeline including court ruling	April 9, 2026	pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/pete-hegseth-restricts-journalists-access-inside-pentagon/
[33]	MTSU First Amendment Encyclopedia	Missouri v. Biden (5th Circuit, 2023) — Fifth Circuit affirmation of district court findings	March 27, 2026	firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/murthy-v-missouri-5th-circuit-2023/
[34]	Lawfare Media	What the Murthy v. Missouri and Daily Wire Consent Decrees Do — and Don't — Establish	May 2026	lawfaremedia.org/article/what-the-murthy-v.-missouri-and-daily-wire-consent-decrees-do-and-don-t-establish
[35]	Reclaim the Net	Rep. Jim Banks puts Pentagon on notice over NewsGuard contract — \$749,387 confirmed, Cyber Command use confirmed	May 11, 2022	reclaimthenet.org/rep-jim-banks-pentagon-newsguard-misinformation-fingerprints-contract

PART I — GLOBAL SURVEY: PRIMARY SOURCES

Sources for the nations survey, global statistics, operative framework, and critical distinction sections are drawn from Freedom House Freedom on the Net 2023–2025; Citizen Lab; Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch; Committee to Protect Journalists; Reporters Without Borders; OSCE media freedom reports; and the platform transparency reports cited individually in the nations entries. Full inline citations appear in the nations section body text.

PART III — THE UKRAINIAN CASE: PRIMARY SOURCES

The following are the primary sources for the Ukrainian case chapter, corresponding to the numbered references in that section's Primary Sources table.

Source titles are cited in their original language.

#	Source	Title / Description	URL
1	Ukraïner	'Potentially Unacceptable' (Nov 17, 2022; updated Jun 3, 2024)	ukraïner.net/en/potentially-unacceptable/
2	Debunk.org / Vilnius University	Facebook content moderation inconsistencies in the context of war in Ukraine (Feb 13, 2023)	debunk.org/news/facebook-content-moderation-inconsistencies-war-ukraine
3	Texty.org.ua	Algorithm of the Ban (Jul 15, 2021)	texty.org.ua/articles/104034/
4	AIN.ua	Twitter and Facebook block Ukrainian activists. Again (Jun 16, 2022)	en.ain.ua/2022/06/16/twitter-and-facebook-block-ukrainian-activists/
5	TheStreet	Is Twitter Banning Ukrainian Activists? (Jun/Aug 2022)	thestreet.com/technology/is-twitter-banning-ukrainian-activists
6	TechSparx / David Herron	Google demonetising YouTubers reporting on Russia's war on Ukraine (Oct 8, 2022)	techsparx.com/google/youtube/google-demonetizing-youtubers-reporting-on-russias-war-against-ukraine.html

7	The Markup	Demoted, Deleted, and Denied (Feb 25, 2024)	themarkup.org/investigations/2024/02/25/demoted-deleted-and-denied
8	RFERL / Georgi Angelov	Pro-Ukrainian Facebook Users In Bulgaria Complain Of Accounts Being Blocked (Jan 20, 2023)	rferl.org/a/bulgaria-facebook-pro-ukrainian-blocked/32238393.html
9	Georgetown Free Speech Project	Amid Ukraine invasion, Twitter mistakenly removes accounts referencing open-source intelligence (Mar 18, 2022)	freespeechproject.georgetown.edu/tracker-entries/amid-ukraine-invasion-twitter-mistakenly-removes-accounts/
10	Sunday Guardian Live	Twitter suspends accounts reporting on Ukraine (Feb 27, 2022)	sundayguardianlive.com/technology/twitter-suspends-accounts-reporting-on-ukraine
11	Reclaimthenet.org	Twitter begins censoring posts documenting Russia's Ukraine invasion (Feb 24, 2022)	reclaimthenet.org/twitter-begins-censoring-posts-documenting-russia-s-ukraine-invasion
12	InformNapalm.org	For the First Time in Six Years, Twitter Blocked All Official Accounts of InformNapalm (Mar 27, 2020)	informnapalm.org/en/for-the-first-time-in-six-years/
13	IMI (Institute of Mass Information, Ukraine)	Multiple reports 2022-2026	imi.org.ua/en
14	Meta Oversight Board	Case #ig-1bmh3dq6 (Dec 8, 2023); Case #fb-mbgotvn8 (Nov 16, 2022)	oversightboard.com/news/485045113689422
15	CNBC	Patreon suspends Come Back Alive page (Feb 24, 2022)	cnbc.com/2022/02/24/patreon-suspends-come-back-alive-a-ukrainian-military-charity.html
16	Lithuania Tribune	Lithuanian developers pull out of Patreon (Feb 26, 2022)	lithuaniatribune.com/90929/lithuanian-developers-pull-out-of-patreon-over-ukraine-ban/
17	LRT (Lithuanian National Radio and Television)	Facebook blocking your Ukraine posts? (Dec 23, 2022)	lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1835447/facebook-blocking-your-ukraine-posts
18	Euronews	Multiple articles on #bucha hashtag block (Apr 5, 2022)	euronews.com/next/2022/04/05/bucha-hashtag-is-being-blocked-by-facebook-and-instagram-heres-what-happened
19	Svidomi.in.ua	Does TikTok threaten national security? The case of Ukraine	svidomi.in.ua/en/post/does-tiktok-threaten-national-security-the-case-of-ukraine
20	CEDEM / Kyiv Independent	Social media giants' unbalanced fight with disinformation in Ukraine (Jan 30, 2024; updated Mar 6, 2025)	kyivindependent.com/social-media-giants-unbalanced-fight-with-disinformation-in-ukraine/
21	BBC Monitoring	Ukrainians petition Facebook against 'Russian trolls' (May 2015)	feeds.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32720965
22	TechCrunch	Twitter reinstates accounts sharing open source info on Russian military threat (Feb 23, 2022)	techcrunch.com/2022/02/23/twitter-reinstates-accounts-sharing-open-source-info-on-russian-military-threat/
23	Freedom House	Freedom on the Net 2023, 2024, 2025 (Ukraine sections)	freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2024
24	European Parliament	Written Question E-002411/2022 (Jul 3, 2022)	europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002411_EN.html

25	Gizmodo	Musk's Twitter Downranks Twitter Spaces Regarding the 'Ukraine Crisis' (Apr 3, 2023)	gizmodo.com/twitter-spaces-ukraine-crisis-downranked-elon-musk-1850293018
26	Newsweek	Prominent Ukrainian Journalist Says She Was Ghost Banned on Twitter (Dec 14, 2022)	newsweek.com/twitter-ghost-ban-ukraine-journalist-olga-tokariuk-1766021
27	IPI	Russian forces detain administrators of RIA Melitopol Telegram channel (updated Jan 2026)	ipi.media/russian-forces-detain-administrators-of-ria-melitopol-telegram-channel/
28	Kyiv Independent	Multiple reports on Melitopol Telegram channel sentences (Sep-Oct 2025)	kyivindependent.com/melitopol-telegram-channel-administrator-sentenced-to-15-years-in-russian-occupied-territory/
29	RSF	USAID foreign aid freeze throws journalism into chaos (Feb 3, 2025); World Press Freedom Index 2025	rsf.org/en/trump-s-foreign-aid-freeze-throws-journalism-around-world-chaos
30	Washington Post	Independent media in Russia, Ukraine lose their funding with USAID freeze (Feb 7, 2025)	washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/07/ukraine-russia-usaid-media-journalism/
31	The Conversation / University of Melbourne	Local newspapers are a lifeline in Ukraine, but USAID cuts may force many to close (Mar 17, 2025)	theconversation.com/local-newspapers-are-a-lifeline-in-ukraine-but-usaid-cuts-may-force-many-to-close-250820
32	Babel.ua	RKIN app / Apple App Store (Jul 2022)	babel.ua/texts/78234-apple-vydaly-la-z-app-store-zastosunok-rkin
33	Sundries.com.ua	Twitter automatically bans Ukrainians who often write about the war (Jun 8, 2023)	sundries.com.ua/twitter-automatically-bans-ukrainians-who-often-write-about-the-war/

PART III — ACADEMIC SOURCES

Source titles are cited in their original language.

Authors / Year	Title	Journal	DOI	URL
Heřmanová, Eriksson Krutrök, Divon (2025)	The algorithm loves the war: ambivalent visibility in content creator practices during war	Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies	10.1080/10304312.2025.2507777	discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10215010
Kyrychenko, Brik, van der Linden, Roozenbeek (2024)	Social identity correlates of social media engagement before and after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine	Nature Communications 15, 8127	10.1038/s41467-024-52179-8	PMC11445580 (open access)
Divon & Eriksson Krutrök (2025)	The rise of war influencers: creators, platforms and the visibility of conflict zones	Journalism	10.1177/29768624251325721	
Bösch & Divon (2024)	The sound of disinformation: TikTok, computational propaganda, and the invasion of Ukraine	New Media & Society	10.1177/14614448241251804	
Badola (2023)	Russia and Ukraine: A Content Analysis of 'The World's First TikTok War'	University of Michigan		deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/177317

AFTERWORD — LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND KEY SOURCES

Instrument / Event	Full Title / Source	Date	URL
UDHR Article 19	United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A	December 10, 1948	un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
ICCPR Article 19	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	In force March 23, 1976	ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights
Genocide Convention Art. II & III	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	In force January 12, 1951	un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml
Rome Statute Article 7	Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	In force July 1, 2002	icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf
Lemkin — Cultural Genocide	Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (1944); foundational genocide scholarship	1944	preventgenocide.org/lemkin/AxisRule1944-1.htm
Starobilsk / Rubicon	Ukrainian General Staff statements; Russian Foreign Ministry media access; Kyiv Independent (May 2026)	May 2026	kyivindependent.com
Bila Tserkva / Oreshnik	Ukrainian Air Force statements; OSINT community documentation; multiple wire services	May 24, 2026	
Zaporizhzhia victim-image operation	Ukrainian fact-checkers; StopFake.org; Detector Media	May 2026	stopfake.org